

FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF
PROGRESSIVE RELIGION



Volume 4
Part 2

SPRING
1951

Number
Eleven

FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF PROGRESSIVE RELIGION

Editor : E. SHIRVELL PRICE, M.A.

Assistant Editor : A. K. ROSS, B.C.L., M.A.

Associate Editor : J. LUTHER ADAMS, Ph.D.

VOL 4, PART 2

SPRING 1951

NUMBER 11

CONTENTS

THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE	
THE EDITOR	49
NATURAL SCIENCE AND LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY	
DR. CONRAD LÖNNQVIST, of Stockholm	51
HOW DOES THE WORLD OF TO-DAY LOOK AT CHRISTIANITY?	
EDWARD A. CAHILL, of Boston, Massachusetts	59
INDIFFERENCE AND UNBELIEF	
JOHN ROWLAND, B.SC.	66
SHEPHERDS, DIFFERENT AND INDIFFERENT	
J. TYSSUL DAVIS, B.A.	69
JESUS AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALER	
FRANCIS TERRY, M.A.	72
NON-ATTACHMENT AND THE MODERN WORLD	
MARJORIE EASTON	81
NEW BEATITUDES	
ROBERT ENTWISTLE	86
THE FOURTH MYSTICISM	
JOHN REDWOOD ANDERSON	87
PART ONE: THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS	

LAUNCHED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE OLD
STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION OF MANCHESTER
COLLEGE, OXFORD, WITH THE FINANCIAL
SUPPORT OF THE DR. DANIEL JONES TRUST
PUBLISHED AT
MANCHESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD, ENGLAND



Editorial and Subscriptions at 23 Cheltenham Avenue, Liverpool, 17
ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION—(Three Issues) 3/- post free
Single Copies 1/-, add 2d. for postage.

The Truth Shall Make You Free

THE EDITOR

THE milestone of a half-century is not an unsuitable time to review some recent assessments of the cause of Freedom and of how it is faring. We shall concern ourselves, all too briefly, with three works. Two of them are mainly objective: the last is personal and prophetic: *American Freedom and Catholic Power* by Paul Blanshard (Beacon Press \$3.50); *Religious Liberty To-day* by H. G. Wood (Current Problems: C.U.P. 3/6); *Dream and Reality* by Nicolas Berdyaev (Geoffrey Bles, 30/-).

The first of these is a well-documented, factual analysis of the organisation, policy and tactics of the Roman Catholic Church. It is indicative of the power of that Church to stifle criticism in America today that the author had great difficulty in publishing his work until he approached the Beacon Press. In it we have a corroborating sequel to *Roman Catholicism and Freedom* written thirteen years earlier by Dr. C. J. Cadoux in this country. By sheer weight of evidence a strong indictment is made against the Church which claims for itself absolute temporal and spiritual power. Among those for whom the seat of authority in religion is a progressively enlightened conscience it must appear that the totalitarian infallibility of Rome is slowly but surely ensuring its own destruction. The mind of man cannot be kept indefinitely pent within the thought forms of pre-evolutionary and pre-relativistic cosmology, nor can power myths continue to have the same absolute compulsion when man becomes more fully self-conscious about what is truly moral in his own motives. Berdyaev holds, in contrast to what is generally believed, that "spirit is revolutionary, whilst matter is conservative and reactionary" (p. 30). This he applies to the avowed materialism of Communism and to religious Orthodoxy which, he says, "contains a strong tendency to materialism, and it is this which provides the authoritarian element in religious life" (p. 80). Materialism, Orthodoxy and Reaction are all bound up together in his view. Seen in this light, the new dogma of the Bodily Assumption of the Virgin is, we suggest, a natural development of the materialism inherent in the primitive idea of a physical heaven. A bodily resurrection of Jesus required such, and also its counterpart, a physical hell for the damned. We can experience a spiritual hell in this life: that we should be required to believe in a physical hell hereafter is cruder materialism than any taught by Moscow. The Roman Church runs true to type both in the new dogma and in its unchanged teaching about hell fire. Mr. Blanshard records (pp. 33-4) that, in 1935, Fr. John O'Brien, writing in the *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, pointed out that fire

is often used in the Bible in a metaphorical sense. He then asked "What good would it do to torture souls without end in another life for sins, however numerous and grave, committed during a few years on earth?" The Roman hierarchy was horrified and compelled him to write an abject apology repudiating the heresy that "Catholics should not be forced to believe in the *eternal torment* of the damned," and accepting the dogma "that such unfortunates never lose consciousness while suffering in *real* fire." When we hear such perverse and diabolical doctrine we know it is not the voice of any divine authority but rather the all too human spite of a power-corrupted and hate-bedevelled authoritarianism. Nicolas Berdyaev bears out our judgment when he says "I have come to the conclusion that the atrocious doctrine of eternal torments in hell is largely a projection of sadistic instincts into the sphere of religion" (p. 64).

In his small but excellent work Mr. Wood makes a careful study of the dangers which threaten from within the democracies as well as from beyond the Iron Curtain. His treatment of the Left-wing intellectuals, notably George Bernard Shaw in his later apostasy, is particularly forceful. In a meticulous attempt to be fair, Mr. Wood shows that the Roman Catholic Church, in holding that Natural Law is prior to the State, can lay claim to be defending liberty against the State totalitarianism (pp.93-4). But he has to admit that the legalistic attitude of this Church whereby, in practice, Law is set before Gospel, and doctrinal intolerance before personal tolerance, invalidates her rôle as a protagonist of Freedom.

Dream and Reality is the story of a human soul which won and maintained its freedom between the upper and nether millstones of Ecclesiastical and Political Totalitarianism. Nicolas Berdyaev is, himself, the victorious answer to these warring absolutes. The quickening message of his autobiography is that a man, if he be true to himself and to the God in whom he lives, need submit to neither of these two soulless imposters. A few of his own words, culled from pages glowing with serene conviction must close this brief.

"I have fought battles with the world not as a man who desires or is able to conquer and subjugate it to himself, but as one who seeks to emancipate himself from this world, as one who resents its ascendancy over the lives of men" (p. 21). "On becoming associated with ecclesiastical orthodoxy I experienced the same anguish which I felt among the nobility and the revolutionaries. I watched the same apostasy from freedom and the same forfeiture of man's creativity." (p. 51). "I have never admitted and I do not now admit any orthodoxy intruding itself on me and asserting its possession of truth apart from my own free quest, my own asking and demanding. . . . I am even inclined to think that compelling orthodoxy has no relation at all to truth and, indeed, holds truth in abomination. The greatest falsifications of truth have been brought about by the orthodox. . . . The freedom of my conscience is an absolute dogma." (p. 53).

Natural Science and Liberal Christianity

Dr. CONRAD LÖNNQVIST of Stockholm

Being an Address delivered at the Conference of The International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom (I.A.R.F.) and the Sveriges Religiösa Reformförbund at Lund, Sweden, July 1950.

MUCH could be said about the relation between natural science and Christianity in general, and especially with regard to orthodox Christianity. Much criticism could be brought forward in this connection. But in the relation between Natural Science and Liberal Christianity a negative attitude will not easily be discovered. It is, however, another question whether there are positive affiliations. Natural Science as it stands today contributes to a certain extent in a positive way to the solution of the problem. Thus, it certainly is worth while, to confront Natural Science with Liberal Christianity. There is no reason why we should not try to detect and analyse a possible relation between our Christian beliefs and the achievements of Science in general and of Natural Science in particular. It is our duty to confront them with each other. The doors should be wide open. Faraday is said to have remarked once: "As soon as I enter the Chapel I close the door of the laboratory behind me." This is certainly not our attitude.

When I said that Natural Science contributes to a certain extent in a positive way to the approach of our problem, some may agree because they believe that Natural Science is reliable only to a certain extent. The picture of the universe, as natural science draws it, is ever changing. And therefore it could be said that there is nothing, whether positive or negative, which could serve as a basis. A collection of papers by the great German physicist, Max Planck, has recently been made available to English readers.¹ Planck is the founder of the quantum-theory which, together with Einstein's theory of relativity, is responsible for the change in the conception of the universe as conceived by science. In one paper on the Meaning and Limits of Exact Science, Planck deals in particular with the question of the reliability of this conception of the universe and thus with the question of what is to be thought of a universe subject to gradual change.

Planck's first submission is that the foundation of the exact sciences is not as absolute as is suggested by the expression "exact." Science, in his opinion, has no other foundation than the perceptions

¹ *A Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers* (Williams & Norgate, 1950).

of the mind, which are of an entirely subjective nature. And yet the development of the physical conception of the universe is far from following a zig-zag-line, (of which one wonders where its end will be). On the contrary, a very clear course of development can be perceived. It is a forward and upward course, towards a more general applicability. Planck does not hesitate to call this nearly a miracle. This fact, he says, should assist physics in regaining the esteem so many deny her. For she now admits that her foundations are not absolute.

Planck is convinced that science is on the right way. Henceforth our conception of the universe will be gradually supplemented and completed. Our fundamental conceptions are constantly becoming more refined, and our conception of the universe unfortunately is gradually becoming more difficult to grasp, more difficult to perceive for him who stands far away. But this cannot be helped; this evolution is a necessity.

In this connection Planck deals with the notion of the "real universe" (*die wirkliche Welt*). And though he admits that this notion is of a metaphysical nature he submits that it is natural that we ultimately aim towards a conception of the universe which is finally conclusive and correct. This is a consequence of the fact that research gradually penetrates deeper into the problems and that the conception of the universe is thus gradually becoming more inclusive.

This finally conclusive and correct conception is, according to Planck, of a metaphysical nature and the investigator has to believe in its existence. His belief will spur him to the endeavour to come nearer and nearer to this final truth (*i.e.* the finally conclusive and correct conception). But he will *never* be able to prove that he has attained his aim.

Modern physics accepts the fact that there are contradictions in its conception of the universe. Planck allows only one: we have to accept the existence of a "real universe" of a metaphysical nature although we will never be able to prove that we have penetrated part of it. The modern double conception of light (particles and waves) in fact does not involve a substantial and logical contradiction. This double treatment develops along precise mathematical principles.

Planck concludes his article with the following philosophical and religious notions:

"Thus we see ourselves governed all through life by a higher power whose nature we shall never be able to define from the viewpoint of exact science. Yet no one who thinks can ignore it. A thinking human being, who has not only scientific but also metaphysical interests, must choose one of two possible attitudes: either fear and hostile resistance or reverence and trusting devotion.¹ The individual has no alternative but to

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 117-8.

fight bravely in the battle of life, and to bow in silent surrender to the will of a higher power which rules over him . . . We must accept every favourable decision of providence, each single hour of happiness, as an unearned gift, one that imposes an obligation. The only good thing that we may claim for our own with absolute assurance, the greatest good . . . that can give us more permanent happiness than anything else, is integrity of soul which manifests itself in a conscientious performance of one's duty."¹

What then is the most important thing modern science has given us? By far the most important fact, in my opinion, is that modern science has abandoned causality in its rigid form. Causality is not valid in the conception of the atoms and it has lost its place as a generally applicable principle in physics. This means that one no longer adheres to the theory that the world is functioning, even in its minute details, along mechanical lines and in a way fixed in advance. Human beings from the scientific point of view can no longer be regarded as robots. The rigid determinism, the materially qualified determinism of a previous generation of physicists was extraordinarily depressing and frightening. What is the sense of striving for truth, goodness and beauty if everything has already been qualified in advance by the condition of the atoms? Our endeavours only have sense or significance when there is room for a certain amount of freedom. Only then can we be said to be building (to that extent) our own future and to be responsible for it.

It is a specific question how human freedom can be said to result from uncertainty in the atomic universe. The well-known British astro-physicist Eddington has studied this problem. It was submitted by him that only a limited number of atoms might be engaged in certain activities of the brain which are of decisive importance. The lack of determination in the atomic universe may thus be invoked as a reason why human thinking and decisions are not determined in an absolutely material and specific way. There is a freedom of choice among several possibilities and the choice we make is dependent on factors non-material. A spiritual truth which has no material foundations may here have its influence. This is suggested by Eddington as a possible explanation, but he leaves the solution of the problem to the future.

The most important thing to us is that modern physics no longer adheres to specific causality. Consequently we are entitled to defend the point of view that man is free to a certain extent without risking that our statement is in contradiction to the findings of modern science.

Once it is agreed that man is free, the question arises how he is going to use his freedom. This is of great importance for our philosophy, for our Christian belief and for our teaching.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 119.

Several physicists have emphasized this freedom and its importance. The British astro-physicist James Jeans for instance accentuates it, though his terminology is more cautious than in Eddington's case. Max Planck also deals with the problem of causality in the book from which I quoted. He agrees that most modern physicists adhere to a non-deterministic conception. He himself tries to defend a mildly deterministic point of view, but he adds that the method is a doubtful one and that he is not concerned with rigid causality in its usual sense; "the law of causality is neither true nor false".

The Secretariat of the I.A.R.F. has submitted three questions to the scientists, who are members of the Association.¹ Some of the answers point out that the modern development of physics is of primary importance. Few others, however, accentuate the significance of determinist causality. It is quite naturally of the greatest importance that the world in which we live is a regulated one. Mrs. Hartmann-Rücklos and her husband, the well-known biologist Professor Dr. M. Hartmann, emphasize regularity and its importance. This point of view is again stressed in an essay in the journal *Freies Christentum* of May 1, 1950. But it is also valid for a conception of a causality of, so to say, 99.9 per cent. Even the fraction which separates 99.9 per cent from absolute causality is of importance. The notions of true and false, of good and wrong are losing every preciseness of meaning if everything we think and value is based on a foundation of uncompromising and unequivocal causality.

In any case one cannot apply physical causality in the way the physicist Millikan does. He says "Moral and physical law both are part of the law of nature, and trespassing upon them leads to misfortune and misery." In my opinion we cannot trespass upon the laws of nature, even though we are free to a certain extent. The moral law is of our own making, and trespassing upon them depends on ourselves. This statement therefore is far from clear.

It is a most remarkable fact that we are able to think and to feel, that we are able to investigate the universe, and still more, that we are able to formulate ideals and are free to try to attain them and that we have the definite feeling that our life has a purpose. All this leads one to believe that we have part in a sort of immaterial reality.

As we are conscious and personal beings the fact of our existence must indicate that the spiritual reality in which we have part is, in fact, of a conscious and personal nature, intentional towards us: a divine being, a personal God.

Many physicists seem to think along this line. I will refer to them later.

But first I would like to dwell for a moment on the creation of the universe and its development. The problem of the creation has

¹ It is hoped to publish a commentary on the answers to these questions, prepared by Professor F. J. M. Stratton, LL.D., F.R.S.—ED.

not been cleared up from a scientific point of view. Previously physicists were of the opinion that the universe had been in existence for all time. This theory was based on the fundamental law of physics that energy and mass is conserved. Then there is a second fundamental law of physics, the so-called law of entropy, according to which no world process can continue unless there exists a difference in temperature between two parts of the universe, from which it seems to follow that there has been in the beginning an original concentration of energy. One has tried however to avoid this conclusion. Certain facts point out that all astronomical systems are expanding constantly and that 2 or 3,000 millions of years ago an enormous concentration existed. This concentration has been subject to a kind of explosion which has hurled the astronomical masses into various directions. Those which are now at the greatest distance from us in fact have, according to our observations, the greatest velocity of motion in the universe. The question however has not yet been finally investigated.

Of greater importance for our subject is the history of the development of life on earth, and it is worth while to investigate what science has to contribute in this field and whether it presents us with arguments which support our thesis.

The vitalist school of biology has claimed for a long time that the laws and forces of a purely physical nature do not suffice in the field of living phenomena. It claims that forces of a determined purpose are working here. The best-known representative of this school of thought was Driesch, but he has not been supported by many biologists. The biologists generally apply physical causality in their investigations. Some of them are of the opinion that the way of thinking based on causality may not suffice. Investigation however has to explain as much as possible by the correlations of causality, and it is impossible to say where and when the laws of causality finally fail. So, one has to return to the mysterious and expedient course of vitalism. The biologist Lecomte de Noüy has recently published a much disputed book about these questions, entitled: *Human Destiny*. He claims that a creative will has more than once interfered in the development of life on this earth. This might even have been the case before life had come to exist, at the stage when protein, which is necessary to any form of life, was created. A protein-molecule, with its several thousands of atoms, is of extraordinary complication. We may, therefore, feel justified in believing it unlikely that the first protein-molecule came to exist by way of an accidental assembling of the atoms required.

The theory of probabilities of chances proves that, supposing such a thing had accidentally happened, it could only arrive in a number of years to be expressed in several hundreds of figures. Much could be said against Lecomte de Noüy's theories, though his way of thinking is of great interest. Of greater importance however is that he tries to prove that some sort of an intention has been

influencing some of the important stages in the history of the development of the living creatures on this earth.

Apart from this, de Noüy's book is not of great importance for our problem. He shows us a creative God, who however is a kind of experimenter, experimenting in several fields and changing the field when some experiment fails. The author submits that after the human race came into existence a gradual development has taken place. He has hardly anything to say about fate and destiny of the human individual. Though he warmly supports the idea of a religious totality and the mystery of life, his conception of God does not offer anything to the human soul which struggles with the problem of the relation between God and the individual. It therefore is somewhat surprising that orthodox leaders of the church in Sweden have recently recommended this book as a scientific statement supporting christian belief in God. In my opinion it is greatly to be regretted that the author leaves aside such problems as existence after this life on earth, and the part the human being has in another universe, or eternal life.

I have dealt with this book at some length because I think it characteristic of the approach of many scientists who are interested in religion and concern themselves with this problem.

Many prominent scientists have turned towards a religious philosophy of life. Their conceptions are often pantheistic or deistic. Julian Huxley, for instance in his book *What Dare I Think?*, defends an idealistic, to a certain extent religious, conception. Yet he states that God has not created man, but that man has created God! Apparently he does not understand that conscious and thinking beings cannot casually have come into existence through the medium of material molecules and atoms. He does not understand that we thus have part in a totally different reality not created by ourselves, but existing independent from ourselves. We really have not created this miraculous reality, we have not created God. Grace has been bestowed upon us that we may have a vague conception of Him. That is all.

To us as Christians neither such a conception nor any other pantheistic approach can be of great importance.

Several prominent investigators of nature, physicists in particular, have defended a more distinct conception of God. Besides Eddington and Jeans, Millikan, Compton, Schrödinger and Planck, who were all awarded the Nobel prize for physics, should be mentioned. Einstein has also expressed himself in this sense. He speaks of: "the great genius (*die hohe Vernunft*) who expresses himself in nature."

Jeans has stated that the physical universe has changed its nature and that the universe can no longer be said to be a huge mechanical system, but that it is more like a process of thinking.

Eddington and Millikan defend in their writings the conception of a personal God, who has an intention towards and for the

human being and can work through its medium. Compton too defends the conception of a God who takes an interest in the individual human being. Schrödinger on the other hand defends a somewhat Hindu conception and quotes the Upanishads. (There is only one ego instead of several. God and the Ego are identical).

Planck is very much impressed with the regularity of nature and is of the opinion that this regularity can also be understood in a theological sense: "The truly prolific results of natural-scientific research justify the conclusion that continuing efforts will at least keep bringing us progressively nearer to the unattainable goal, and they strengthen our inner hope for a constant advancement of our insight into the ways of the omnipotent Reason which rules over Nature." "Nothing stands in our way of identifying with each other the two everywhere active and yet mysterious forces: the world order of natural science and the God of religion. Accordingly, the deity which the religious person seeks to bring closer to himself by his palpable symbols is consubstantial with the power acting in accordance with natural laws for which the sense data of the scientist provide a certain degree of evidence." "While both religion and natural science require a belief in God for their activities, to the former He is the starting point, to the latter the goal of every thought process. To the former He is the foundation, to the latter the crown of the edifice of every generalized world view." "Religion and natural science are fighting a joint battle in an incessant crusade against scepticism and against dogmatism, against disbelief and against superstition, and the rallying cry in the crusade has always been, and always will be: '*On to God!*'" ¹

This may all be very stimulating and interesting, but what is lacking in most of the conceptions is the discussion of an outstanding difficulty in a religious life: the omnipotence of God. This becomes yet clearer when the epithet All-Good is added. Not only the protracted and wearisome evolution of life on earth towards the "Arrival" of the human being, the only conscious one, is of importance. There is also the problem of the weird and the atrocious in our existence, though it is admitted that the human being himself is partly responsible for these elements. But the atrocious and the weird are also found in other sectors of the living world. It often appears as if human existence were impregnated with the most outrageous senselessness.

I think that we could and should assert at this stage that human existence is not contained and complete in itself. Such a thesis is supported by the newer conceptions of the universe. Modern physics counts with more dimensions than those which can be graphically described. Modern physics not only co-ordinates space-time to a totality. This four-dimensional continuum turns new dimensions out, which we cannot possibly understand by way of

¹ *A Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers*, pp. 181-4 and 187. (*Religion and Natural Science*).

perception. They can however be approached by way of mathematical equations. Physics has to count with these mysterious new notions, these unseizable dimensions. By way of them a more general and a more complete conception of the universe is achieved. Quite naturally the modern conception of the universe will still have to be improved and completed, but this development will continue along the same line (Planck). We have to take into account that the construction of the world is not as simple as we may have thought. Dimensions of a totally different nature from those in which we live do exist.

Our existence in this world is not complete in itself. Spiritually we are perhaps in relation with another existence, in different dimensions. All the weird and the apparently senseless, the often shocking injustice we believe to be witnessing here, may find its explanation when, after we have died, our horizon has been extended in another existence. It seems important to me that Eddington and Jeans in particular, point to the eventuality of another existence.

In concluding I want to say that the ethical sermon is essential in free Christianity. There seems to be general agreement on this point. But as these questions are more on the orbit of philosophy than of science I have to leave them aside, interesting as they may be.

In summarizing I want to say that we should, in my opinion, not deal in a sermon with the notion of an omnipotent creator. We should however stress the unassailable marvel that we are living, human beings, partaking in a spiritual reality. We may leave the question of how the human being came to exist on earth, or how the universe during millions of years has been wrestling and struggling, in genesis and downfall, in renewed creation and wanton waste. We may leave that aside, as a mystery, which is incomprehensible and, to a certain extent, even frightening. The problems of the universe should make us humble and devout. But we may build on the fact that we have come to be thinking and creative beings. And there lies the way to the Gospel. Because it is impossible to believe that there was no intention in man being endowed with the capacity of thinking and creating and striving towards a greater perfection. Here lies our point of contact with another existence from which we receive help and inspiration to the same extent as we anticipate this existence itself. The greatest of men has revealed to us what our aim should be. In Jesus Christ we meet a divine power, purifying, elevating, sustaining. The final answer to everything inexplicable is in that other existence to which we already belong by our very nature.

It is there that we finally will reach the goal and the perfection.

How Does the World of today Look at Christianity?

EDWARD A. CAHILL of Boston, Massachusetts

Being an Address delivered at the Conference of The International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom (I.A.R.F.) and the Sveriges Religiösa Reformförbund at Lund, Sweden, July 1950.

HOW does the world of today look at Christianity? This paper will assume that the relation between the world and the Christian Church is different from what it has been in the past and that the history of the development of this difference is essential to an understanding of what the present world demands of Christianity in general and of liberal Christianity in particular.

The Christian Church at the height of its power was almost absolute in its determination of cultural, political and economic patterns. Whatever the ultimate source of cultural motivation the church had an important share in shaping it and determining its final application. From that day until today the Christian Church has moved through various degrees of dominance. Today it finds itself a sort of vestigial institution tolerated by society as long as it does not make too much trouble. Its value, as far as society is concerned, is almost solely that of a conserving institution. To the careful observer, today, it is apparent that more people are less and less influenced by organized religion. If we are frank about it, we must admit that the Church, as an institution, has become a ceremonial church, an instrument for measuring social status, and a conservative political force.

When I say, "a ceremonial church," I mean that more and more the function of the church as far as lay people are concerned is to provide the ceremonial background for birth, marriage and death, plus a diminishing ceremonial function at civic and state affairs. When I say that the Church has become an instrument for measuring social status, I mean that church membership has become more a criterion of class position than a witness to a particular way of life.

In America, and I believe in Britain, one's membership in a particular kind of church is a rough index of one's social position. We have society churches, middle class and lower class churches. Insofar as the church has become a symbol of class position in its various degrees, it has lost its universal community-wide function. As far as the church as a "bulwark of the state" is concerned we have an area of self-analysis which is delicate. The parallel growth of Protestantism and Nationalism has resulted in our Protestant

Churches becoming for all practical purposes "national churches." On the surface the problem seems quite different between America and Europe. The difference, however, is less profound than it seems. In America we have no state churches and our Constitution specifically prohibits the state from favouring one church over any other. In fact, however, the Protestant Churches of America are American Churches, and we are caught, as is the European, on the horns of the nationalist Christian dilemma.

The trends about which we are speaking have all been observed in past generations by students of the church and of social trends. Max Weber in his chapter "The Spirit of Capitalism" says: "Any relationship between religious beliefs and conduct is generally absent." Weber means that in any community standards of conduct are generally accepted and are more general or universal than church membership. To put it another way: it would be impossible for an outsider to pick out the members of a church by observing the conduct and behaviour of the people in the community. In the business world, for instance, men who have no church connection behave within the same framework of accepted conduct as churchmen.

From the point of view of the practical organisational problems of maintaining a church institution, we can catch a glimpse of the degree to which the church has been influenced by the social structure in which it exists. The church in a very real sense has become "Big Business," and as an inevitable result, it has become susceptible to the competitive strains of the economy.

The situation which confronts us is this: the Christian Church has moved through its history from a position of almost absolute dominance in the determination of cultural, social and economic patterns to its present precarious position on the periphery of cultural determination. The process which has carried the church from its position of almost absolute dominance to its present position on the periphery is called the *secularisation of our culture*.

Dr. Sorokin, the Harvard sociologist, in his book *The Crisis of Our Age*, attempts to measure the degree of secularisation statistically. It has become the habit of churchmen and sociologists like Sorokin to categorise all culture which is not distinctly religious in the traditional sense as secular. By using these hard-and-fast categories of secular and sacred we succeed in dividing our world into two mutually exclusive areas of cultural expression. If one follows these hard-and-fast categories, one cannot help but draw the same conclusion that Sorokin makes, namely, that the sacred has diminished to the point of nothingness in its ability to motivate and condition our world.

In my opinion, it is a mistake for liberals in the field of religion to fall into the trap of this dichotomy. It is too easy altogether to define the word sacred in terms of the self-consciously religious and thus exclude vast areas of human concern and expression from the

scope of sacred religion. Once traditional dogmatic Christianity had succeeded in crystallising its categories of religious and non-religious, of sacred and secular, it tied itself to their limitations in terms of the evolution of culture. The Christian institution has paid a heavy price for its dogmatic supernaturalism. Without continuous appeal to reason, without continuous testing of concepts and categories, openmindedness and social flexibility disappear and the church becomes locked in a circle of consistent self-enclosed error which it has mistaken for eternal truth. Liberal Christianity, if it is successfully to fulfil its function in society, must always beware of that kind of absolutism and the hard-and-fast categories which are implied by dogmatism.

In the process of cultural change and evolution a great change has taken place in the alignment of social forces. The old equilibrium has been destroyed. Our culture has been transformed from one in which the church—the sacred—was in a position of dominance, to one in which the initiative has passed to other institutions. In reality the old culture has been destroyed and the new culture has not yet been born. Churchmen, in describing their present status, tend to explain this breakdown of the old culture by categorising the present lack of equilibrium as secularisation. Whatever we call it, the fact remains that the relationship of the Church to the world and its culture is different from what it was. The unchanging supernaturalism of traditional Christianity is a potent factor which operates culturally to bring about the so-called secularisation of the world.

The tight closed cosmology of the Middle Ages was shattered. The discovery of the New World has become an historical symbol for what happened. The discovery of the New World was both the discovery of a place and an idea. The actual existence of a new world released man from confinement in a closed world system of thought. New horizons were opened before him. Constructive avenues of escape became available and life became adventurous, not only for those who sailed across the sea, but for the masses who stayed at home and dreamed. Physical wealth poured back to the Old World and the actual physical lot of people became more bearable. The discovery of the New World threw old regions and old institutions into new relationships.

Not only was there a new world in the field of geography, but there was a new world in the heavens as well. Man's spirit slowly shook off the chains of bondage and as his life began to seem good to him his concern for the next world declined. He learned to take his religion or leave it alone. Life itself became good. This world, and not the next, began to absorb man's attention, and when the Church attempted to teach him doctrines which flew in the face of his hopes and dreams he began to relegate that Church to a subsidiary position in the complex of social institutions. The dogma of Salvation, used for centuries by a dominant and powerful Church to

club the soul of man into submission, was no longer effective. He rediscovered and began to have confidence in his problem-solving ability. Science and mechanics developed under the stimulation of man's curiosity to see new worlds, and out of his growing optimism in life itself. The Church during all this period attempted with inflexible tenacity to maintain its hold upon mankind in terms of past concepts and functions. The inevitable result was that ever increasing areas of social expression were defined by the new world of the spirit in terms which had nothing to do with the hard and fast category of the sacred.

All of these factors, operating over centuries, have produced a so-called secular world of practical affairs which has superseded the Church in its daily and constant influence upon the lives of human beings. The people of the western world, when confronted with the choice between an inflexible religious dogmatism and the new world of science and practical affairs, have decided against religion as a prime motivator and influence in their lives. The religious institution has been relegated to the position of a ceremonial institution and conservator of value. That this is important no one will deny, but when compared to the creative role which the Church might have played, we can see how much has been lost. The amazing thing in this whole process is that the traditional Church, while crying out against the dangers of secularisation, has stuck to the old concepts. By maintaining this hard-and-fast division of culture into the two mutually exclusive categories of sacred and secular, the Church has resigned to the other institutions of society its dominant role as prime determiner of value. This is disastrous, for not only is the Church the loser, but science, economics and all culture is denied the value creating service of a religion thoroughly integrated with its world.

The Church can no longer function constructively as it has done traditionally. It must reorient itself, transform itself in terms of what has happened to our culture over the past several centuries. It must recognise that new occasions teach new duties. To attempt to continue to function as of old is to court sociological suicide.

Institutional momentum is a powerful force and those who decide, as liberal Christians, to remain within the framework of traditional Christianity must be prepared to be absorbed most of their time in holding the line against the enveloping force of the established patterns. To advocate change and shift of emphasis against this background is to court rejection by the traditional Church. The liberal wing of the established Church is always inhibited in the application of its principles and the logical working out of its destiny by the necessity of being accepted by the majority within the institution who do not share the liberal position. Over and over again it is the liberal minority which must make the compromise, if it is to continue to exist within the framework of the established Church. To continue to do so in the face of the

world's need for organic unity is to deny the Liberal Church any chance of playing a major role in determining the future state of the world.

The use of these words sacred and secular assumes that the sacred is something different from and superior to the rest of life. When these categories are applied they divide the ordinary man within himself at a time when the unified self of the mature person is demanded. The Mediaeval Church had and produced a unity and equilibrium; the Liberal Church must regain it. It cannot be regained, however, in the old terms; it cannot be regained by trying to bring to life a dead past. The old days have gone and the new unity must be projected upon a new level demanded by the new circumstances. The Liberal Church, if it is to fulfil its rôle, must lead the way and point the new direction. It must recognize as a prerequisite that the traditional Church has lost the initiative in cultural determination. It has lost this initiative just because of its smug superiority; just because it has divided the values of society into sacred and secular.

As the equilibrium of the old culture has disappeared, a competition of value systems has developed. The existence of these contrasting value systems is apparent to a very large proportion of the population and not just to philosophers, theologians and anthropologists. The contrast in the field of value is not only between two massive political systems, but is present within the cultural system of the western world. Christians have begun to question the fundamental values of a civilisation which has produced an abundance of material achievement and which has not matured enough to know how to use its achievement constructively. General Bradley has said, "Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants." This crisis in value has been intensified by a new factor—the sheer rapidity of change. In the face of rapid change, people and institutions are reluctant to desert accustomed values. In all the great cultural systems of the past, values have been imparted precisely because they were stable, because people half-consciously or unconsciously felt they could rely on their values as representing the distilled essence of experience. However, as Whitehead points out: "The whole of this tradition is warped by the vicious assumption that each generation will substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its fathers and will transmit those conditions to mould with equal force the lives of its children. We are living in the first period of human history for which this assumption is false."

Belief in God as revealer, judge and punisher has unquestionably weakened in the western world. Formal participation in a Church can no longer be regarded as a symbol of belief or conviction. An increasing number of people, while still wearing the label of church membership, are acting as if they had abandoned the old beliefs. For millions the powerful Christian sanctions for conformance to established values have lost their effective force.

This is not to say that any other institution of society has succeeded in finding the formula for the re-establishment of stability in the field of value. It is to say, however, that the Christian Church has lost the initiative and is ineffective in the determination of behaviour.

Faced with this problem, we in the Church can, and many do, beat a retreat to the older orthodoxies. We turn backwards and attempt to dress up the elements of the old system with new terms. The dynamic circumstances of our age demand much more from an institution which calls itself religious. Whatever the rest of Christianity does, that branch of the Christian institution which calls itself liberal must be sure about this; namely, a new approach consistent with the achievements as well as the demands of our times is needed. As a prerequisite for fulfilling our rôle in history as liberals, we must understand that we cannot sit still, bearing chaos, waiting for the miracle of a new religion to occur.

We must begin to understand that there is an alternative between dogmatism and anarchy—between a gospel of despair and one of superficial optimism. Always and everywhere men have said, "This is good, this is bad—this is better, this is worse." All cultures have had their categorical imperatives which have gone beyond survival or pleasure. The important thing is not the content of these value judgments but the fact they have been made. It is not a sufficient answer to brush this aside as ethical relativism and then beat a hasty retreat into dogmatic absolutism.

These new circumstances present to liberal religion a challenge. We have the opportunity of providing our culture with the integrative factors necessary for a dynamic stability. It is for Liberal Religion to begin to produce the logical categories and the empirical methods and techniques to deal with behaviour in terms of value. There is a lot of talk of despair, in these days, and the optimistic view of man's nature and potentiality has fallen into disrepute. It is unfortunate that religious liberalism has been so closely identified with the superficial optimism of the past century. The liberal religious institution made the mistake of identifying itself with a specific doctrine rather than with a basic method and attitude of approach. The alternative to superficial optimism is not a doctrine of despair, but rather a more courageous and enlightened approach to the problems of mankind and of social organization.

The liberal movement must take the lead in breaking down the barriers of thought, concept and behaviour which at present divide man within himself. There is no economic man as distinct from religious man—there is only man. We need a philosophy and a religion for the *whole* man, in which the integrated articulate being which is man finds articulate expression consistent with his experience. This philosophy must be consistent with and not separate from the content of man's cultural, social, and scientific knowledge. Liberal Religion must never think of itself in terms of

superiority to man, society, economics, etc. It must merge itself into the whole social content, but proud to play its rôle in man's attempts to solve his problems.

Liberal Religion must develop the courage and initiative to break loose from traditional Christianity in its institutional form. There is no future for a liberalism which desires to enter the ecumenical movement through the back door, and which maintains the label 'Christian' by means of verbal casuistry. Ordinary human beings today are not concerned with other-worldly salvation. At least their day-by-day behaviour gives evidence that they are acting as if they did not believe in it. This is what is called secularisation by the traditional Church, which is no answer at all.

Our culture needs a value-creating religious institution to act as a catalyst in the process of developing an integrated social equilibrium in which the individual human may find the opportunity for healthy spiritual growth and maturity. I believe that Liberal Christianity and Liberal Religion everywhere can meet this challenge and fill this need.

This is not a superficial optimism and there is nothing foolishly ideal about the hope that Liberal Religion has this kind of future. If we dare to shed old concepts and categories and clear out the old words and attitudes which carry the dead weight of centuries, we shall have the chance to make the kind of contribution to man's spiritual growth and maturity of which the world is in such desperate need. These are dangerous times. Change is so rapid that qualitative as well as quantitative factors result. To stand still is to die and yet to move without consciousness of direction and value is meaningless. This is the disequilibrium of which the social scientist speaks. The Chinese symbol for *Crisis* is made up of two elements; one is *Danger*—we know what that means—the other means *Opportunity*.

Our liberal optimism today, in the face of danger, survives because of the opportunity inherent in this time of crisis. There is danger, yes, but there is equally the opportunity which is ours! The opportunity to make available to the world a creative religion consistent with and integrated into the totality of life in all of its ramifications, in all of its variety of function and of kind.

Indifference and Unbelief

JOHN ROWLAND, B.Sc.

THE international situation has become such that many people, of nearly all schools of theological thought, are now tending to regard Communism as the main direct enemy of religion. That Communism of the orthodox kind is directly anti-religious is, of course, true enough; but it may not be realised by many assiduous attenders at the churches that there are other opponents of religion, at any rate in this country. In those countries of Eastern Europe usually referred to as "behind the iron curtain," Communism is, no doubt, the only opponent of religion which the Churches—and particularly the Roman Catholic Church—regard as being worthy of attention. But in Great Britain the direct influence of Communism is small, and the membership of the Communist Party is infinitesimal.

The first and most dangerous opponent of religion in Britain is indifference. The religious beliefs of Christians of every school appear to a very large number of British people not so much impossible as irrelevant in the twentieth-century world. This is a new phenomenon. In the past there have been atheists and agnostics who have attacked religious beliefs; there have been few indifferentists—at any rate outwardly. Naturally, in ages when religious belief was thought to be the only respectable attitude to take there may have been a good deal of indifference behind the outward show of acquiescence; that is something now impossible to assess. And it may be that what is happening is merely that churchgoing has ceased to be socially obligatory, with the result that those who regard church services as either a bore or a waste of time can show this attitude without any loss of social status.

Indifferentism is usually not acknowledged in the orthodox circles of the religious or the irreligious in this country. Yet it is the enemy of the Rationalist Press Association and the National Secular Society as much as of the Roman Catholic Church and the Salvation Army. The young man (or woman) who goes to the cinema, or on a long cycle ride in the country, on a Sunday has, in effect, said that the problems of religion are of no interest. Such people may in practice act as agnostics, averring that these problems are insoluble; but, as regards taking any interest in theological discussion, they rank as pure indifferentists.

Yet, as far as the directly irreligious organisations of this country are concerned, the mistake which many people within the Churches are making—and it may prove a fatal mistake—is in thinking that an attack on Communism and its philosophy will be sufficient in itself to ensure the survival of the orthodox attitude in the Great Britain of fifty or a hundred years' time.

Admittedly, the membership of such organisations as the National Secular Society and the Rationalist Press Association (to name the two principal opponents of religion on the non-political plane) is small. It is doubtful whether the two societies combined have more than ten or fifteen thousand members, and some of these dwell outside the British Isles. But no one who sees the ubiquitous Thinker's Library in the bookshops can have any illusions about the literary influence (which spreads far beyond the active membership of the organisations) of the works issued by publishing houses whose main function is to attack the religious attitude to life.

Now, the proportion of the population affected positively or negatively by the Churches is much smaller than it was a hundred, or even fifty, years ago. And of that proportion a considerable number would take the attitude that religion is something which may have its superficial attractions, but which rests on a basis which is no longer intellectually tenable.

And certainly, whatever the beliefs of the individual Christian, it is probable that many regular attendants at church services go largely because their parents went. They have learned something about the religious attitude to life, but often they would be hard put to defend it against the arguments of a knowledgeable unbeliever. The conversion of an atheist or an agnostic, in spite of the statements sometimes issued by such organisations as the Christian Evidence Society, is a fairly rare event. Mr. C. S. Lewis, for example, has stated in one of his books that he was at one time an atheist; but few who have ever been intellectually in the atheist camp would find themselves wholly convinced by his arguments. Dr. C. E. M. Joad, for long a prominent member of the Rationalist Press Association, is another who has come to take up a directly religious attitude; but when he contributed to *The Rationalist Annual* an account of his new attitude to religion the majority of his readers would simply be inclined to view him, in his own words, as "another good Rationalist gone wrong."

In other words, of those who take any interest in religious questions, a fair proportion are finding it increasingly difficult to share or even to appreciate the attitude of the Churches. And it is exceedingly doubtful whether some of the Churches are doing all that they might to convince the more thoughtful of unbelievers that there is anything in the nature of a logical and arguable case to be made out in favour of religion.

True, the Student Christian Movement Press has published a number of little volumes in the half-crown series known as *Viewpoints*; these are interesting, but very uneven in their literary and theological merits. The best of them was probably Mr. J. M. Cameron's *Scrutiny of Marxism*, which contained a brilliant description of the Marxist attitude to ethics and history. But even Mr. Cameron's book was far more convincing in its description

and analysis of Marxism than in its later attempt to provide a Christian substitute.

The main thing to be remembered is that Marxism and Communism are rival religions. They have their Bible (Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*), their saints (Lenin and Stalin), and even their heretical sects (Trotsky and Tito). The danger to Christianity which comes from Communism, then, is the danger from a fundamentally religious rival. The danger from the other side, the side of the scientific atheist or agnostic, is quite different. It is the danger of the man who sees no reason for the holding of any religious belief, or who considers that such a belief is contrary to the evidence.

And while a Communist (as has been clear from the arguments of some recent converts to the Roman Catholic Church) may exchange one kind of dogmatic belief for another, there is far less chance of a man who is convinced that agnosticism or atheism suits his personal attitude to life ever coming around to a basically religious point of view.

All this, of course, ignores the directly political viewpoint. That is a viewpoint that cannot be entirely ignored. The world, in spite of all that the more moderate politicians have tried to do, has divided into two parts. It may be over-simplification to say that half the world is now controlled by the Kremlin and the other half by an alliance of Wall Street and the Vatican; but it is not completely false. It is only in the more moderate countries, such as those of Western Europe, that there still exists a strong body of opinion opposed to both these political camps. Admittedly those who do not wish to be lined up with either Moscow or Rome have a difficult decision to make. Sometimes they may feel their sympathies tending in one direction, sometimes in the other. But on the whole many moderately-minded people dislike both camps, and (in Great Britain, at any rate) are not afraid to say so.

These pages are no place for political comment. But this reference to international politics has been made for a deliberate purpose. When we have (as we certainly have in Great Britain) some thousands—probably hundreds of thousands—of people who dislike equally the “party line” of the Kremlin and that of the Vatican, what will be their reaction to Churches which condemn the excesses of Communism, but ignore the equally obnoxious tyranny of Franco Spain, or the treatment of Negroes in the U.S.A. or South Africa?

The discussion, up to this point, may seem to be unduly pessimistic, but this is not necessarily so. It is important, if the Churches are ever again to play any adequate part in the intellectual life of this country, for them to get free of the attitude they have taken in recent years. Only, after all, if a larger proportion of the young can be brought within the Churches is the future secure.

The tide of indifference may, of course, prove impossible to stem. Such efforts as the recent attempt to convert the people of

London show that the majority of those who have never had the habit of churchgoing are probably impossible to influence. But there are many thoughtful people who find Christianity—as stated by most orthodox denominations—difficult to believe. And if something is not done to state the religious attitude in terms which are intellectually acceptable to the majority of those people—particularly those with experience in scientific studies—they will be permanently lost to Christianity.

There are many schools of thought within the more orthodox Churches. Most of them today have such an emphasis on supposed dogmatic certainties that they tend to repel the modern-minded. But the erstwhile unbeliever (and more especially the erstwhile indifferentist) may be captured by a theology which accepts reason as its basis. Communism and Roman Catholicism are rival totalitarianisms which will tear the world in twain if some mediation does not come. It is from the side of Unitarianism and Liberal Christianity that this mediation must derive. And that is why, in this twentieth century, Unitarians with their strong affirmation of the three great principles, Freedom, Reason and Tolerance, have a more important role to play than ever before in their long history.

Shepherds, Different and Indifferent

J. TYSSUL DAVIES, B.A.

IN Peter Ustinov's play, *The Indifferent Shepherd*,¹ two parsons discuss several problems which concern our clerical readers. For example—the complexity of motives with which we have entered the profession. Those motives have not always embraced a definite and irresistible call, though it is generally taken for granted. We may be sure that some compelling drive lay behind the choice our men have made to enter a ministry which promises so little chance of making a mark upon the world and so little opportunity for achieving personal ambitions.

Sometimes it has meant an escape from some distasteful job. Sometimes the histrionic role affording self-expression in a vocal way. Sometimes a sheer despair at resolving one's personal problem. A vague desire of doing some good in one's day and generation.

¹ *The Indifferent Shepherd*. A play by Peter Ustinov, produced at the Criterion Theatre, London, Feb. 1948.

A mode of self-discipline which no secular position could supply. One or many of a hundred reasons.

The reason which the Vicar in the play had for entering the ministry is an aesthetic passion. He is set in contrast with his brother-in-law, the Army Chaplain, who is as sure of himself as Henry is diffident and modest.

Hugh the Padre has an answer for every question. He thinks in black and white, discarding the shades of grey, whereas his opposite number loves nuances in human character, and in the adorable tints and hues of natural phenomena in clouds and flowers, purple hills and green waters. Henry's idea is that a parson should try and make people see the beauty and charm of common things, see a world in a grain of sand, and a heaven in a wild flower.

Henry: "To me religion is something infinitely poetic—by which I mean that it's no use explaining that God is the Father of us all . . . and not be able to inspire in our congregation even a fragmentary appreciation of the beauty of say—clouds, and infuse a measure of beauty into the drab lives of our flock." The fact that stares him in the face is that the cut-and-dried method is the one which seems to help certain persons who need someone else to think for them and on whom to lean, whereas he has too tender a respect for the convictions of others, and too deep a reverence for the sacredness of personality and its delicate sensitiveness, to take measures for thinking for them and carrying their burdens.

"I am interested in human beings" he says, "in their unpredictable and irresponsible nature, and that leaves very little room for dogma or any other considerations."

Hugh, the Padre, answers Henry by saying that "the secret of your comparative lack of success (he means, 'his failure') as a leader of men is that you doggedly insist on keeping an open mind . . . How do you think I could preach the true gospel if I could not organise and simplify my thoughts so that they reach the ear and the brain of the people?"

One regards the instinct and conscience and the milk of human kindness as the true spirit of Christianity, and the other regards instinct as the heathen part of human nature.

Earlier Henry has defended himself: "You believe the sermon to be a functional piece . . . a functional piece of embroidered morality. Can it not also be a work of art?"

The outcome of their argument is that Hugh sums up his view of a parson as a kind of moral policeman, and Henry his view as that of a moral pavement-artist.

It is rather a compliment to our cloth that these young modernists should take us seriously and stage us in their play not as objects of ridicule but as part of the human scheme of things, and seek to understand us.

How do we regard ourselves? Have we representatives of these two schools in our midst? We have obviously no place for

dogmatists, yet those who have come to us from a distaste for the darker ideas, like eternal torment or the activities of Mr. Bolfry, may lean slightly toward a dogmatic downrightedness.

Today the parson has a harder task to vindicate his place in the social economy than ever before. What is his value to a community which is absorbed in economic ideologies and communistic ideas and national and international concerns? To the present generation these are far more pressing problems than spiritual liberation or self-realisation.

What one may term without offence as the parson's entertainment value has gone down considerably. It is a free choice and not obligation that determines his usefulness at the moment. More than ever it becomes a cardinal sin for the parson to be dull. There should be no place for a parson who bores his congregation. However high his ideals, however noble his aspirations, however sincere his aims, however sacrificing his character, if he is naturally dull, he ought to be a Prison-chaplain or a Custom-house officer or a Ticket-collector or any other decent vocation rather than "wag his pow in a poopit."

He need not be learned, but he does need to have common wisdom, and a sense of humour, and the grace of brevity and the charm of persuasiveness. He must have eloquence. That embraces clear diction, elocution, the rich flavour of a pleasant delivery, quite apart from a burning enthusiasm for the truth, and a loving delight in the common ways of contemporary men and women.

He ought to be a rare raconteur, with a flair for the quick wit, a lover of good literature, and a good musician.

His main interest should be the things which concern his own people. And not his private hobbies like the lost races or the binomial theorem or the Cagots. Even football coupons might offer parables of arresting significance. He should be alert to every breeze of fresh mental occupation.

The Eternal Verities? Of course! But as they undulate beneath the tapestry of human life in constant movement; and underlie the daily duties, pleasures, concerns, of the hearth and board, wages and food prices and Channel swimmers and Wimbledon matches.

It is the dramatist's fun to put into the mouth of Hugh, "There's nothing like sharing the people's games and drinking with them to make them feel religious . . . I believe that religion has to be humanised." So the Army Padre lays down the law. In that respect, many of us would fail miserably, and perhaps be willing to fail.

Jesus as a Psychological Healer

FRANCIS TERRY, M.A.

THE last fifty years have seen great advances in the understanding of nervous disorders and the sub-conscious mind. Can these advances in psychology be used to throw light upon Jesus' works of healing? Only, I am afraid, in a very small proportion of cases: in most of the gospel narratives there is little that is helpful for present purposes. But, in just a few instances, I believe that definite results are obtainable, and that these are very relevant to the understanding of Jesus' character.

The details which modern psychology finds significant, as expressing the sub-conscious attitude of the patient, are mostly of a sort that would seem quite unimportant to the members of the early church, who would therefore, in the course of oral tradition, feel themselves at liberty to omit or vary them at discretion. The result is that, in general, there is little left which can be relied upon for our present purpose, while some features may be positively misleading. For instance, the actual healings are usually narrated in a brief and conventional style which gives the impression that Jesus' methods were short and rapid, depending on a few authoritative words of exorcism: but this may quite well be the result of the dropping from the traditional stories of details which seemed to be irrelevant; and we must be prepared to revise this impression if better evidence points to a contrary view.

Fortunately Mark's gospel stands in a somewhat different position. Though a rather mixed and uneven document, it seems in some passages to bring us very near to the recollections of an eye-witness, and thus to preserve details which oral tradition would have omitted or modified—such as Jesus' repudiation of the epithet "good." It is therefore possible that Mark's account of cures may contain details which, though their significance was not understood at the time, had stuck in the memory of a witness, and can thus reveal new significance to the modern mind. Mark twice mentions that Jesus took a patient aside (vii, 33 and viii, 23) and, though the interviews are very briefly described, and one of the patients was a deaf-mute, we get an impression of careful attention to the individual patient and his particular state of mind and requirements. We would like a fuller account of what took place. In two cases I believe that a comparatively full account has in fact been preserved.

The first case is that of the "Gadarene Swine" (Mark v, 2—19):

"(2) And as soon as he had come off the boat, he was met from the graveyard by a man with an unclean spirit; (3) who lived in the graveyard, and no one could any longer bind him even with a chain; (4) because he had often been bound

with chains and fetters, and had snapped the chains and broken the fetters, and no one was strong enough to control him; (5) and all night and day he was in the graveyard and among the hills, screaming and cutting himself with stones; (6) And when he saw Jesus at a distance he ran and knelt to him; (7) and screamed out: 'What business have you with me, Jesus, son of the highest God? For God's sake, do not torture me' (8) because he said, 'Come out of the man, you unclean spirit.' (9) And he asked him, 'What is your name?' And he answered, 'Regiment is my name, because there are a lot of us.' (10) And they begged hard of him not to send them out of the district. (11) And there was a great herd of swine grazing on the hillside nearby. (12) And they begged him 'Send us to the swine, so that we may go into them.' (13) And he gave them leave. And the unclean spirits came out and went into the swine, and down rushed the herd over the cliff into the sea, about two thousand of them, and were drowned in the sea. (14) And the herdsmen fled and carried the news to the town and neighbourhood, and they came to see what had happened. (15) And they reach Jesus and find the madman sitting properly dressed and sensible—the same who had had the 'Regiment.' And they were afraid. (16) And those who had seen it told them what had happened to the madman, and about the swine. (17) And they began begging him to leave their district. (18) And as he was getting into the boat the man who had been mad asked to go with him. (19) And he would not let him, but said to him, 'Go home to your family and tell them all that the Lord has done for you and taken pity on you.'"

The first interesting feature in this story is the picture of the man running to Jesus, flinging himself at his feet—and then refusing to be cured. It is not a detail which would be likely to be invented: indeed, when Matthew and Luke repeat the story, they both omit it (*Matt.* viii, 28—34; *Luke* viii, 27—39), leaving only the "meeting," which might have been sudden and unexpected. Why should an unclean spirit voluntarily come within Jesus' power? On the other hand, assuming that the man has heard about Jesus (and people may well have threatened to bring the latest exorcist to deal with him), his behaviour exactly expresses an ambiguous state of mind which is typical of the neurotic patient—a conflict between desire to be cured (which brings him to the psychologist's consulting room) and refusal to be cured (which is the cause of constant "resistance"). I therefore think that there is good reason for accepting this detail as authentic and significant.

The account of the man's first words (verse 7) may be influenced by Mark's theory that evil spirits recognised Jesus (*cf. Mark* iii, 11) and there is a suspicious verbal resemblance to a parallel incident (*Mark* i, 23—27). But it is possible that exclamations such as the present did occur, and formed, as it were, the starting point of the

Marcan theory. Whatever the words, the situation requires that the man shall speak distractedly and show reluctance to be cured.

There are stronger grounds for suspecting the words of exorcism attributed to Jesus (verse 8). Not only are they precisely what conventional theory would expect, but their position looks extremely like an afterthought. The evangelist has related the incident as it had been vividly described by an eye-witness: its odd character then strikes him, and he tries to soften this by explaining what, he feels sure, must have happened. I therefore believe that Jesus did not attempt exorcism at this stage.

Now comes another feature, which is not likely to have been invented. Jesus asks "What is your name?" Commentators usually take this as addressed to the infesting spirit. I take it as a simple enquiry addressed to the man. The issue is one which can not be settled by fine linguistic considerations, since Mark does not write a sufficiently accurate style. It has to be decided on grounds of general probability. Thaumaturgists sometimes claimed to control spirits by making use of their names. Jesus very likely believed in these claims. But would he not have felt profound repugnance against using such methods himself? And, in this case, why should he believe that a spirit which refused to be exorcised would meekly state its name? It all seems very far-fetched. On the other hand, Jesus, faced by a stranger, who seemed to want his help, but was talking in a wild and distracted manner, might quite naturally seek to put the man at his ease and establish personal contact by asking his name—especially if the man himself had previously addressed Jesus by name. It would be typical of Jesus' faith in God that he should ignore the unclean spirit and speak direct to the man in a normal personal way. The question would also serve to remind the man of his status as a responsible individual, and the days when he had lived among relations and friends who treated him as a person and called him by name.

If the man had given a sane answer to the question, it would have marked a decisive step towards recovery—a decision to resume his position as a human individual. At first he shrinks from the step, and rejects what it implies. He answers not in his own person but as a mouthpiece for the unclean spirit, and declares that even this is not an individual but a multiplicity of spirits. It is the natural expression of a divided mind refusing an offer of wholeness.

Then the man gets over his first revulsion (possibly with the aid of further unreported words of Jesus) and begins, as it were, to toy with the idea of a cure. It is a very neat piece of psychological mechanism. He clings to the assumption that he is a mere mouthpiece of the spirits—for to abandon this would be to admit himself cured already: but, under this disguise, he expresses an increasing willingness to contemplate a cure. "If the unclean spirits are sent out of him, where will they go?" "Please do not send them too far!" We are not told how Jesus received these entreaties. He must

at least have avoided discouraging the man, who at last expresses definite willingness to be cured, though, till it has become effective, this has still to be disguised as a request by the spirits: "Send us into those swine." Jesus realises that this is a suggestion which ought to be accepted: he gives his assent, and the cure follows. Note that it is not command, but assent to a proposal emanating from the patient.

At this point, the evangelist transfers his interest to the swine and their keepers, and we are told nothing more of the man until he re-appears in verse 15. It has been suggested that attention is thus diverted from something the man did to frighten the swine. This seems highly probable. The swine, as the new habitations of his enemies, would provide the man with suitable objects on which to externalise the destructive impulses which had formerly been directed inwards and caused him to gash himself with stones: he would probably rush towards them in a hostile and alarming way. The eye-witness would quite expect a man to behave violently as evil spirits left him, and would think that they were simply sweeping him along in their wake, as they rushed into the swine. In telling the story he (or the evangelist) would omit this as an irrelevant detail which distracted attention from the main issue.

There was then presumably some further conversation when the man returned to Jesus and quieted down. Finally he wishes to accompany Jesus but is bidden go home and tell his relatives what has happened. This last detail is probably authentic, as it conflicts with Mark's usual view ("The Messianic Secret"). The story would assure the relatives that he was really cured, and make them feel that, as God had shown kindness to him, they must do the same. It is possible that the man, at his sanest, was always a bit defective, and therefore only fit to be at home, but doubtful of his reception there. That would be an important factor affecting his behaviour.

The second case in which we have details of a conversation that is psychologically significant is that of "The Epileptic Boy" (*Mark ix, 14—29*). Jesus, with a few intimates, is returning to the main group of disciples :—

"(14) And when they reached the disciples, they saw a great crowd around them and scribes arguing with them. (15) And as soon as the crowd saw him they were all astonished, and ran and hailed him. (16) And he asked them: 'What are you arguing with them about?' (17) And one of the crowd answered him: 'Teacher, I brought my son to you, because he has a dumb spirit; (18) and at every seizure it tears him, and he foams at the mouth, and grinds his teeth, and becomes rigid; and I told your disciples to cast it out, and they had not the power.' (19) And he answered them: 'O unbelieving generation, how long must I be with you? How long must I bear with you? Bring him to me.' (20) And they brought

him to him. And as soon as it saw him, the spirit threw the boy into convulsions, and he fell to the ground and rolled about, foaming at the mouth. (21) And he asked his father: 'How long has this happened to him?' And he said: 'From childhood; (22) and often it has even thrown him into the fire and into water, to destroy him: but, if there is anything you can do, have pity on us and help us.' (23) And Jesus said to him: 'That "If you can"! Everything is possible for a man who believes.'" (24) Immediately the boy's father cried out: 'I believe: help my unbelief.' (25) And as Jesus saw that a crowd was rapidly gathering, he rebuked the unclean spirit and said to it: 'You deaf and dumb spirit, come out of him, I command you, and never enter him again.' (26) And, with screams and violent convulsions, it came out; and he became like a corpse, so that most of them said he was dead. (27) But Jesus took his hand and raised him; and he stood up. (28) And when he had gone indoors, his disciples asked him privately, 'Why were we not able to cast it out?' (29) And he said to them: 'This sort of thing can be got out by nothing but prayer.'"

In this passage the conversation takes place not with the patient but with the patient's father. Men of that day would see little connection between such a conversation and the ensuing cure: accordingly, when the story is re-told by Matthew (xvii, 14—21) and Luke (ix, 37—43), the conversation is reduced to a single speech. To-day we know how deeply the mental health of children is affected by the psychology of the family. A neurosis of the child may be provoked by its position as a focus of resentments or jealousies which warp the parents' attitude towards it, most often without their being conscious of this. Even when the parents have contributed little to the origination of the disease, they have usually come to terms with it, adjusted themselves, and found psychological compensations, of which a cure would uncomfortably deprive them. As Freud has said: "Those nearest to the patient frequently show less interest in his recovery than in keeping him as he is." When the patient is utterly dependent on the parents, this factor may operate as an invisible obstacle which, till it is removed, makes recovery impossible. Psychological re-adjustment on the part of the parent may thus be a necessary condition precedent to the cure of the child.

In the present case, the father's first approach (17 and 18) has several suspicious features. He is ready to give up at the first attempt: the disciples' failure may be a theme for argument and perhaps for complaint, but he is not stirred to take any further practical steps. He does not appeal to Jesus or entreat him to intervene; nor does he express any sorrow or disappointment. He simply states the facts. His words have just the tone of a customer saying to a bootmaker, "In your absence, I brought a pair of old shoes to your assistants to be repaired, and they made a bad job

of it." People who wish for miraculous aid usually "entreat" or at least "ask" for it (both words are used by Mark in other causes): this man relates how he "told" or "spoke to" the disciples for them to cure the boy; if not actually rude, the phrase is certainly very casual. And, instead of simply saying that the disciples "could not" perform the cure (which might be due to many causes, including the possibility of his own unworthiness), he ascribes the failure entirely to their deficiency, using a phrase which, in the circumstances, is inconsiderate if not actually discourteous¹ and is not the one which they use of themselves at verse 28. Luke (ix, 38—40) and Matthew (xvii, 14—16) have both independently made alterations to improve the man's tone and manners, which must have struck them as in need of it. It would appear that the witness had conveyed an impression of a hard, curmudgeonly speaker, which is reflected in Mark's wording. They are the words of a man who does not wholeheartedly long for his son to be cured. He has thought it right to bring the boy: but he was not fully committed and so does not feel personally implicated in the failure. He may share the point of view of the scribes, who probably look on the case as an opportunity for testing the claims of the new movement, and find it quite convenient to be able to call attention to such a disappointing result.

This explains Jesus' outburst of impatience (19). How blind men must be, how lacking in any real belief in God as their Almighty Helper, when they can speak of miraculous aid in such a cheap, cold-hearted, double-minded, pettifogging spirit, with no mention of God's power and goodwill, or of human hopes and prayers, but only of the inefficacy of the exorcists!

However, there is the boy to be thought of, so Jesus has him sent for—probably, in view of verse 25, to a place a little away from the crowd. On being confronted with a new healer, the boy goes into another fit.

Jesus asks how long the boy has been thus afflicted. The question has no relevance to conventional ideas of exorcism, but it sets the father remembering and talking. The actual rehearsal of the case-history need not have been so brief as it appears in the written account, which reduces it to what the evangelist regards as relevant. Recollecting and describing the boy's infancy, the first onset of the trouble, and the most alarming incidents which have marked its course, would have the effect of getting behind the cold attitude which has become habitual, and reviving the father's natural feelings which have been repressed. For the first time (verse 22b) he makes an appeal for help which sounds as though it is earnest and comes from the heart: he commits himself along with his son by using the first person plural.

¹ The same verb occurs at *Luke* xiv, 29 and 30 (of the foolish man who built on a scale beyond his power to complete), at *Mark* xiv, 37 (reproaching Peter's failure to keep awake), and at *Matthew* v, 13 (of the useless salt).

Still, however, a qualification is made: "If there is anything you can do." This may seem mere reason and courtesy: but it also indicates that the man is prepared to accept failure, keeping open a psychological line of retreat, getting ready to say, "I besought the healer most earnestly to help us, but, as I more than half expected, there was nothing he could do." People who are whole-hearted do not envisage failure or indicate in advance their readiness to accept it. Jesus promptly seizes on the point. That is not the way to ask. The man of faith regards all things as possible. This connection between faith and whole-heartedness is central in Jesus' outlook, though modern men do not always see it so clearly. But at least its psychological aspect is quite simple. As long as we believe that our decisions will not be effectual, we can go playing with inconsistent desires: for instance, we can gratify our desire to play a heroic role by entering our names as volunteers for dangerous duty while also retaining our love of safety with the reflection that the chances of actually being selected for the task are not very great, so that we can still secretly hope not to be chosen. On the other hand, if we know that our decision is certain to be effectual, we really have to make up our minds. Thus belief that "everyone who asks receives" is a challenge to be whole-hearted in our asking, while double-mindedness makes it hard for a man to believe that people actually do receive what they ask for.

The reproof seems to strike home and provoke an emotional crisis (verse 24). The father "cries out" (according to a reading which may just conceivably represent the true text, he does so "with tears"). A conflict has come to the surface. He believes, and does not believe, in Jesus' power to help; at the back of his mind, he has probably been desiring, and not desiring, that help shall be possible. In this conflict he asks that belief shall prevail over unbelief. It is a decision in favour of the boy's recovery, or at least the beginning of such a decision. Jesus, realising that there is no opportunity for further clearing up of the matter, proceeds to formal exorcism. This produces a violent crisis followed by improvement, which, if the father's attitude is really changed, may prove permanent.

The disciples then question Jesus privately indoors. He explains that "prayer" is essential to enable such cases to be exorcised. For Jesus, "prayer" was not a formal thing, but genuine desire turned towards God in faith. There had been no such "prayer" in the father's heart at the earlier stages of the interview. Can it be said that anything in his later attitude amounted to prayer? There was genuine desire, together with struggling faith, and, though no words were directly addressed to God, the whole transaction was concerned with the seeking of divine aid through the power of God's kingdom: thus, from Jesus' point of view, the essentials of prayer were now present. The words caused difficulty at an early date, as readers took them as applying not to the father

but to the disciples. Luke, in his account, omits the final scene. Matthew (xvii, 20) made Jesus say, not that "prayer" but that "faith" was necessary, in consonance with his earlier outburst of impatience, and added sayings about faith addressed to the disciples in other contexts in *Mark* and *Luke*. Then scribes added to the Marcan version by turning "prayer" into "prayer and fasting", thus prescribing the mode of ecclesiastical exorcism—and perhaps reckoning that Jesus had returned from an expedition on which he had not partaken of food, while the disciples would have been having their usual meals at headquarters. Later, the extended Marcan verse was copied into many manuscripts of *Matthew* (xvii, 21). These variations show the difficulties experienced in bringing this passage into accord with the ecclesiastical outlook, and thus tend to confirm its genuineness.

In commenting on these two Marcan passages I have made frequent references to the derivative versions in *Matthew* and *Luke*. The comparison shows that the most psychologically significant features are usually eliminated or distorted even by a single re-telling. It confirms the view that, for an understanding of Jesus as a healer, no reliance can be placed upon any material outside *Mark*: other evangelists may preserve an occasional isolated detail of truth, but we cannot check this, and the total impression is most misleading. Even in *Mark* we see the start of a similar process.

Jesus, as we see him in these two passages, was not a "commanding personality," imposing his will by a few authoritative words, and producing results by the forceful impact of his own faith and character, but one who meets men and converses with them. Apparently, on occasion, he does use formal words of exorcism; but they are at the end of an interview. On occasion, he does express impatience at what strikes him as spiritual unreality; but it is the preliminary to an interview. On the whole, he is patient, and takes time to treat people as individuals. Instead of relying merely on his own will, he waits for decision on the part of the person concerned, or elicits it by challenge. He complies with suggestions that point in a right direction, even if they are a bit odd, like the suggestion that the spirits shall go into the swine. We should probably find the same qualities in fuller accounts, if we had them, of the two brief incidents previously referred to (*Mark* vii, 32—35; viii, 22—25): in both there are individual interviews, with unusual modes of treatment, which may have been adopted in compliance with suggestions of the patients; and in the latter case we have Jesus asking the patient what he sees and the latter replying that he sees men "because they look like walking trees"—which sounds like a fragment of what might have been a very significant therapeutic conversation. When at *Mark* i, 41, Jesus declares his will that a leper shall be cleaned, the apparent command is in fact an exact *compliance* with the man's previous demand; there was also something in this encounter which angered

Jesus, but the account is too condensed for us to know what it was. Jesus approves and confirms decisive action, as a proof of "faith," even when it takes apparently unauthorised forms, as in the case of the woman who touched his clothes (*Mark* v, 25—34; here, while not claiming the merit of the cure, he takes care to confirm it, so as not to leave any disturbing impression of unauthorised stealth), and that of the man whose friends broke open the roof to get him to Jesus (*Mark* ii, 3—12; here there are features which suggest a slight possibility that it may be an unhistoric product of homiletical imagination); there may also be some doubt about the Syro-Phoenician woman, which shows the same approval of unauthorised and ingenious pertinacity (*Mark* vii, 24—30, and an interesting variant which has been combined with it at *Matthew* xv, 31—38). Whether these last incidents are historic or not, they illustrate the early view of Jesus as a man who recognised and warmly supported the right of other people to make up their minds for themselves, provided they are whole-hearted about it—as contrasted with the later ecclesiastical view of him as the *authoritative* founder of an authoritarian organisation.

There remain only seven further passages to be referred to, two or three of which are of doubtful historicity, while none are of much moment for present purposes. They are: *Mark* i, 23—27, the Demoniac in the Synagogue, brief, highly stylised, and shaped to illustrate doctrine and theories; i, 30 and 31, Peter's mother-in-law, very brief; i, 32—34, summary of several cures; iii, 1—5, Man with Withered Hand, told purely from the point of view of Sabbatarian controversy; v, 21—24 and 35—43, Jairus' Daughter, an interesting and fairly full incident, giving an impression that Jesus behaved naturally and unassumingly and kept his head, but with no special psychological interest; vi, 5 and 6, note of comparative failure in his own country; x, 45—52, Blind Bartimaeus, a brief, perhaps artificial story in which Jesus is hailed "Son of David."

One question remains. How far did Jesus share the beliefs of his contemporaries in evil spirits, or anticipate modern views of the sub-conscious mind? The answer would seem to be that, intellectually, he shared the current views, but that his belief in God's power and goodness and accessibility to human prayer rendered such views largely irrelevant. Spirits could not prevent a man from hearing the gospel and turning to God for help. Therefore Jesus would practically ignore the spirits and speak direct to the man. If the spirits began to contemplate a change of abode, that was a sign that the man was beginning to make up his mind and asking God to be rid of them, and he should be encouraged to proceed along those lines. On the other hand, failure should not be ascribed to the strength of the spirits, but to the self-deceptions and corruptions of heart which prevent men from turning to God in full truth. Thus his religious faith enables Jesus to keep his attention on the human facts of each case.

Non-Attachment and the Modern World.

MARJORIE EASTON

TO commend in this twentieth century such attitudes as non-attachment, self-denial, self-naughting, is to sound an unpopular note. It is to invite the criticism of being out of step with the trend of civilisation. But civilisation was not always dedicated to the free expression of the human ego. Before the great urge for self expression was born in the Renaissance, gathered force in the industrial expansion and found confirmation in the freedom of the "new psychology," it was widely recognised that the way of self denial was the higher way, even though its practice was of necessity limited to the few. It is true that the cultivation of non-attachment to the things of the world is in direct opposition to this modern society that begs men from every hoarding to adorn and pamper and inflate their ego in ever new ways, but the way of self-naughting is as old as the philosophy of religion and as universal as man's recognition of the Divine imperative. It is therefore, to say the least, a life attitude that should not be abandoned without examination.

I

There is no need to present a brief for this theory of life behaviour which Christianity expresses in such unpopular and difficult texts as:

"He that would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me."

"He that loveth father and mother more than me is not worthy of me."

"He that saveth his life shall lose it, but he that loseth his life for my sake shall save it."

It suffices to begin with our human situation, aptly indicated by Mr. Macneile Dixon in his Gifford Lectures of that name. "Life is a unique experience. There is nothing with which to compare it, no measure of its value in terms of some other thing, and money will not purchase it. Yet with this pearl of price we know not what to do . . . that mortals should desire immortality and yet find difficulty in passing an afternoon—if you have a fancy for paradoxes, here is a pretty one." Indeed there are plenty more such: the dissatisfaction of workers who have obtained considerable possessions: the boredom of amusement seekers: the paralysing fear of losing possessions or power or loved ones that steals the sweetness out of the enjoyment of human life. Last but not least is the bitter frustration suffered

by idealists who have given their all for a fine cause that has mis-carried, and who echo the Preacher's cry: "Then I looked on all that my hands had wrought and on the labour that I had laboured to do, and behold all was vanity and a striving after wind, and there was no profit under the sun."

For such fears and frustrations the sages have offered their remedy in the attitude of detachment. St. John of the Cross writes:

In detachment the spirit finds quiet and repose, for coveting nothing, nothing wearies it by elation and nothing oppresses it by dejection . . . for as soon as it covets anything it is immediately fatigued thereby.

The Bhagavad Gita has it:

Not shaken by adversity,
Not hankering after happiness:
Free from fear, free from anger,
Free from the things of desire,
I call him a seer and illumined . . .

Thinking about sense objects will attach you to sense objects.
Grow attached and you become addicted,
Thwart your addiction, it turns to anger;
Be angry and you confuse your mind:
Confuse your mind, you forget the lesson of experience.
Forget experience, you lose discrimination.
Lose discrimination and you miss life's only purpose.

Chuang Tzu has this opinion of the wise man:

. . . I mean one who does not permit good or evil to disturb his inward economy, but rather falls in with what happens and does not add to the sum of his mortality.

But for all the ancient wisdom modern man cannot put back the clock in this matter of self expression, and embrace the ideal of self denial. Not only is that term hallowed by countless saintly examples, it is at the same time sullied by the unnatural austerities by which religious men and women have unwittingly intensified their self centredness. We know well enough that to deny the self is no way to transcend it. In that the Indians were wise before us. The Bhagavad Gita recognised: "The abstinent run away from what they desire, but carry their desires with them." For all their flashes of insight the saints of old saw themselves as complex tangles of conflicting feelings. Psychology has somewhat shown us the way through the tangle. We have the main plan. We have some idea of what we are seeing when we look upon the self. We know that we should sin against the whole glory of creation if we again denied the self in the old sense of that phrase.

After three hundred years of self expression the dissatisfaction of our human situation is upon us again, but we meet it at a higher point of knowledge. So we talk not of self denial and self naughting,

but of non-attachment of the self to these material causes of disquiet that add so weightily to the sum of our mortality. But even that is not far enough. We must go further. If, as they say, nature abhors a vacuum, certainly the human spirit abhors negative exhortation. It seems better therefore to abandon the negative idea of non-attachment and think instead of God-attachment. We can then say that if the self is detached from possessions and powers, from hopes and fears and all that, being subject to time and decay, brings disappointment and frustration, it can then attach itself to God and, realising its immortality, dwell serenely, undismayed by the assaults of time.

II

It is useless to go further at this point without considering how this attitude of God-attachment can be practised in modern competitive society. For escapism is no panacea for our modern ills. We do not solve the problems of modern living by getting us to a monastery or even by repairing to a self-supporting craft community. The modern religious man is bound to ask, "Is God-attachment consistent with full membership of modern society?" Idealists have made their gesture of poverty, but civilisation will never be redeemed by the few who become chargeable to the goodwill of their neighbours.

In point of fact never in the economic history of civilised Europe have men and women been in a better position than at present to follow the way of God-attachment and so practise themselves in non-attachment in the matter of possessions. The number of those for whom living depends upon the fluctuations of season and demand is becoming steadily smaller. The regular arrival of the weekly pay packet assures them of the basic necessities of human living. And should industrial machinery be required to regulate wages, such claims can be made in non-attachment and with dignity, without the psychological disturbances of the worker body that now manifest themselves in unofficial strikes and "go slow" tactics. Modern economy and the Welfare State for the first time make it possible for God-attachment to be combined with a full and normal responsibility for public and for family life.

It quickly springs to mind to question the effect of God-attachment upon social progress and to remark that in the East, where this doctrine has been more fully accepted than anywhere else, social progress has been virtually unvisualised. It may well be that the cause of Eastern apathy in this matter lies with other doctrines held alongside that of self denial, and that temperament and climate enter in. The fact remains that no one is freer than the God-attached to take up the crusade on behalf of the less fortunate. Possessions do not stand in his way. Promotion is a matter of no concern. He is even above the disappointment of an unsuccessful issue, for he does not ask the personal satisfaction of success, but only the opportunity to serve the ends of life.

Those who complain that they cannot today get active interest in good causes will find the reason precisely here. People cannot respond because they are tied to their ego and to all the extensions of their ego that modern life provides. It is as St. John of the Cross declares.

The soul that is attached to anything, however much good there may be in it, will not arrive at the liberty of divine union. For whether it be a strong wire rope or a slender and delicate thread that holds the bird, it matters not, if it really holds it fast; for until the cord be broken the bird cannot fly.

The only way to break the apathy of the present time is to break the cord that binds men to themselves, but it is they alone who can cut their bonds.

Mr. Aldous Huxley in his *Perennial Philosophy* calls attention to another of our typically modern attachments, that to knowledge as such:

One thinks of the heroic efforts that had to be made by Galileo and his contemporaries to break with the Aristotelian convention of thought, and the no less heroic efforts that have to be made today by any scientist who believes that there is more in the universe than can be discovered by employing the time hallowed recipes of Descartes.

Until those who seek knowledge pass beyond the sin of attachment, where in the words of the *Theologica Germanica* "knowledge and discernment come to be loved more than that which is discerned, for the false natural light loveth its knowledge and powers which are itself, more than what is known," until then mankind will not pass beyond the facts of the test tube and the balance to discern that which cannot be weighed and measured, the reality of spirit.

III

Chief among the problems raised by the attitudes of God-attachment is its relevance to the predominating development in our modern world of the self. Never in the history of mankind has man realised as completely as today his personal identity, his selfhood, his individuality. Do we, in advocating the doctrine of non-attachment to the ego, attempt to turn the tide of self development, whose waves have swelled through the opportunities of the Renaissance and the discoveries of modern psychology to produce from the tribal group a community of self-responsible individuals? The answer is that never before in the history of mankind has it been as possible as it is today for the individual to profess an attitude of non-attachment to the self. We have every opportunity to understand ourselves, to see ourselves, to develop ourselves. It is not an emasculated, denied, under-developed self that we turn to God. It is a fully developed, fully responsible individual who will

wisely turn from attachment to power and possessions, to attach himself to God. The modern soul will not need to bind himself Godward by the old vows of poverty, obedience, chastity. He can possess the necessary furniture of living without the monkish sin of attachment to the meagre amenities of his cell. The fully developed, wisely knowledgeable man or woman can use the possessions and the passions of the world for their true purpose and still be unenslaved by them.

It is customary among some to deplore what they call the cold virtue of Stoicism and to ask whether through non-attachment we are to deny ourselves the eager adventurousness of the modern spirit. The God-attached soul is not denying its nature; it is in the only possible way fulfilling it, in attachment to spiritual values. Wise enough to avoid the old pitfall of entrapping itself in its own hopes and fears, it is free to wing its way to the furthest reaches of the Spirit. The attitude of God-attachment does not stifle our much prized will to live. It gives the will to live its chance to live, not in fears and frustrations, in possessions and passions, but in the wider life of the Spirit.

IV

In conclusion some may ask by what exercises shall this attitude of God-attachment be attained. It may be unduly optimistic to take this view, but it would seem that those who ask for exercises have not fully decided to detach themselves from possessiveness. If it seems hard to become non-attached in the matter of human affection or prestige, one would think that God-attachment is not fully made, that in the old phraseology the will is not fully surrendered. And certainly to talk of mortifications in the old sense is to browbeat from without a self that should easily have surrendered from within. Such counsel does not rule out self examination. Some unrecognised habit of attachment may surprise us long after we have accepted the general principle. And for thorough self examination the writings of holy men and women who have gone before us in the way are wholesome stimulus, though we must ourselves contribute to their works that sense of joyous vitality in a fully developed self eagerly questing forward into the realms of spirit, which is our characteristic twentieth century note. For let it never be forgotten, this life attitude is not an end. It is a means: a means to what the ages have always called Wisdom. Thus Philo says,

The rout and destruction of the passions, while a good, is not the ultimate good. The discovery of Wisdom is the surpassing good. When this is found all the people will sing.

New Beatitudes

R. M. ENTWISTLE

BLESSED are the spiritually humble, for their hearts shall ever be open to the quickening of God.

Blessed are the inwardly obedient, for they make straight the way of the Lord within themselves and for their fellows.

Blessed are all quiet minds, all peaceable souls, for, like the Divine Stillness itself, they hold mighty forces in check and spread peace among men.

Blessed are the gentle of spirit, by nature and by grace, for their kingdom is not of this world and they are our saviours from much calamity.

Blessed are they that follow after love, for pure love is God Himself, and there can be no greater blessing than to possess Him inwardly.

Blessed are they that seek truth in truthfulness, for in their sincerity and humility shall they discern what can be known and rejoice in what is beyond understanding.

Blessed are the patient, for in their noble endurance they shall be akin to God who is Himself infinitely patient with all, both good and evil.

Blessed are the generous forgivers of sins, with whom injuries do not rankle, for in forgiving others they are themselves cleansed of much pride and vanity.

Blessed is the man who is constant through many trials, for he shall learn selflessness and enter into the tranquillity of the Divine Will.

Blessed are the quietly courageous, the unaggressive, unmilitary, yet humbly and lovingly heroic in thought and spirit, word and deed, for they are the firm rock on which men shall build securely the house of true community.

Blessed are they who are not afraid to be alone with God, in prayer, in solitary places, in social action; whose strength is in God and not in man, for through them shall come the redemption of an evil time.

Blessed are all creative spirits whose fecundity is ruled and redeemed by grace, for they have removed from old Chaos and Darkness into Divine Order and Light.

Blessed are they who have so wonderfully sublimated their aggressive passion that the energy of their wills is subdued and merged with the Divine Initiative, for these are surely saved.

Blessed are they who have gazed upon the Eternal Beauty, the unveiled Divinity; whose spirits have fallen in love irrevocably with the Beloved; whose lives are unconditionally given to Him as their last end; for in this is the crown of life.

The Fourth Mysticism

JOHN REDWOOD ANDERSON

This article arose out of a letter in which I endeavoured to answer a question put to me by a friend. My friend's question ran as follows:

"In my mind there are many conflicts concerning the claims of soul and body . . . Must we lose the world? I suppose to the true mystic it is not a case of must, not a question even of desirability, but just a process of inevitability. But in losing the world, what exactly is it that he gains in its place? Surely it is indefinable! But what conflict can there be between the indefinable and the so very 'tangible'?"

PART I: THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS

BERDYAEV in, I believe, *The Meaning of History*, enumerates three main types of mysticism already extant or having existed. Chronologically taken, these are: the mysticism of the Vedânta (of the old school of Chankara); the mysticism of the pre-Christian Enthusiastic Cults of the Near East that invaded the Greek and, later, the Roman world, such as the cult of Dionysus; and Christian mysticism itself. Unlike the majority of Christian writers, Berdyaev acknowledges all these, and not only the last, to be forms of genuine mystical experience. But they are not merely three forms of the same 'Quest'—forms differing only in their historical, theological, or philosophical expressions: they are three fundamentally different quests, though all three aim at the same ultimate conclusion, or object—the object of all and of any kind of mysticism: the escape from the finitude of the self; or, better, self-transcendence. One and all, they take for granted Nietzsche's dictum, though not in Nietzsche's sense: *Der Mensch ist etwas das überwunden werden soll*—"Man is something that must be surpassed." But their means of arriving at this enlargement of consciousness and transcendence of self are radically different and, indeed, radically opposed; so, too, are the kinds of enlargement envisaged and the regions, if I may use such an expression, into which the liberated soul escapes. To appreciate this difference on its theoretic side, and hence to appreciate the practical difference of method and attitude, it would be well to have before us some generalised scheme or sketch-map of the world as reflective mysticism has elaborated it. For my purpose here, none serves so well as the map sketched for us by Plotinus, for in it all possible regions are indicated. Plotinus may be said to have arranged his world in a system of four descending strata:

(i) *The One*: to which he attaches the numerical symbol τὸ ἓν μόνον (the One-Alone), and of which he says, οὐκ ἔστι ("it is not"), indicating by this that his Absolute, like the Brahman of the Vedānta, the "God beyond Being" of Basilides, and the *Gottheit* of Eckhart, lies beyond the categories of Being and Non-being. Eckhart, indeed, calls it pure Being, but is careful to use only negative terms to indicate it; just as the Vedāntist says, *Neti, neti*—"it is not this, it is not that." In its pure essence it cannot be thought of as either subject or object of experience, since, in it, subject and object are identical. It is pure impersonal experience if such a concept can be grasped; and even to call it "experience" is dangerous and doubtful: it is rather the Ground of all experience—pure consciousness.

(ii) *Nous—The Intelligible World*: to which Plotinus attaches the numerical symbol τὸ ἐν πολλὰ (the One-Many). It is the world of Platonic "Forms" or Archetypes—a far better word than "Ideas." But these Forms, or Ideas, are not mere things thought by the Divine Thinker, passive archetypal pictures, so to speak: they are rather active powers within the Divine Mind. The analogy is, of course, taken from the human mind, and is at best only an analogy. Regarded as a whole, and set over against "this world" (see (iii) below), it is the Personal God of religion, and has its Hindu equivalent in Ishvara, the Lord, of the Vedānta system. But it is only Plotinus—or, at least, he was the first—who gives expression to the significant fact that, in the Intelligible World, the unity is not separable from the diversity, any more than "I" can abstract myself from my mental processes and they still remain *my* mental processes, and "I" still remain "I". Nevertheless, the One of this One-Many is not the mere sum of the Many, nor are the Many the mere activities of the One. The true relationship of this One and this Many (of the One-Many relationship τὸ ἐν πολλὰ) lies entirely beyond our logic, which is a kind of Euclidean logic, and quite outside all normal experience; though, as I shall hope to show, Art does give us an analogous experience. Next below this we have:

(iii) *The Sensible World*: to which Plotinus attaches the numerical symbol τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ (the One-and-Many). This is our world, the world of our normal experience, and indeed of any finite experience whatsoever. In it, as in our logic, the One is separate from, and exists over against, the Many. It is this separation of the One and the Many that gives rise in Christian theology to the whole vexed problem of Theodicy, to the problems of Free Will and Predestination, of prayer, and of God's Justice and Providence. This Sensible World can be grasped by our intellect, because our intellect itself is one of its products and is, as it were, fashioned upon it. But for all that, it is not a world that is self-explanatory: it is the world of phenomena, and only a radical Phenomenology can be applied to it. The moment you seek

“real causes,” or the “real essences of things,”—*noumena*—you are driven beyond the Sensible World and beyond its logic: only the Intelligible World with its non-Euclidean logic* can meet your requirement. Here, in the Sensible World, God is envisaged as something apart from the world, and, almost inevitably, as the Creator, or Artificer, of that world. It is round this “sensible” notion of God that all our human ideas of Him have gathered, making so dense an anthropomorphic screen that the true Theomorph is hidden from us. Here the person of God and the person of man stand in radical opposition,† as a mutually exclusive finitude is necessarily imputed to both God and man, in spite of all the polite (and ultimately correct) language theology applies to God. *In this World*, my finitude denies God’s infinity, and my will His omnipotence. A point of some theoretical importance should be noted here. The Sensible World of Plotinus is not itself a direct emanation from the Intelligible World, but rather the product, or creation, of the World-Soul, the Third Person of the Neo-Platonic Trinity (the other two being the One and the Nous), herself an emanation from the Intelligible World, the Nous. This is “Nature,” when “Nature” means more than the sum-total of natural phenomena, but is yet not identified with God. It is, at present, not a scientific concept, but rather a mythological expression: nevertheless, it is something quite other than mythological in the minds of such writers as Wordsworth, Shelley, Walt Whitman and Goethe; nor was it a mythological idea to the mediaeval “nature mystics.” My point here is that this Sensible World as a whole has its own psychological counterpart: the World-Soul, of which, for Plotinus, our souls are parts or emanations. It is the sphere of the Energies of Nature considered theologically: the Daemonic World (but not the World of Demons). Finally, below all these we have:

(iv) *The Many-Alone* (τὸ πολλὰ μόνον). Of this Plotinus does not say, οὐκ ἔστι, “it is beyond existence,” but characterises it by the much more vigorous term, τὸ μὴ ὄν “that which has no being.” This is the World of absolute Plurality and is, of course, unthinkable; for, though we may persuade ourselves that we are thinking of absolute plurality, we can only do even this by assuming that plurality into the unity of our own mind. But, altogether apart from thought, if a number of entirely separate elements are to function together (and it is only as so functioning that we have any knowledge of them), they must of necessity be members of some system, and such a system would be the very “One” that the πολλὰ μόνον denies. With this “World” of pure non-being—the *reductio ad absurdum* of Pluralism—we have nothing to do. In Platonic language, it is the world of Matter

* Cf. Ouspensky: *Tertium Organum*.

† ‘Before God all men are in the wrong’—Kierkegaard.

without Form; but such a Matter cannot be thought, and is, in fact, only the possibility of manifested Form. In Plato it figures as "The Container."

We are left, then, with the three upper strata of our Universe to deal with:

(i) The One-Alone: the Absolute: Brahman: the Abyss: *die Gottheit*: and, in some sense, Boehme's *Ungrund*.

(ii) The One-Many: Nous: the Intelligible World: Ishvara: God (as personal, or as mind): the Archetypal World or World of Ideas: the Spiritual World.

(iii) The One-and-Many: the Sensible World: our Universe known and unknown: the region of the World-Soul: Nature: the Daemonic World: Creation: the Field of Natural Energies*.

Having this mystical sketch-map of the world before us, we can now place the three types of mystical theory, practice, and experience, as these are distinguished by Berdyaev. Of these, the first, historically, is that associated with the Vedānta doctrine of India in its stricter form, that, namely, of Chankara. In this, the soul (or, rather, the Atman) seeks complete identification with Brahman. It seeks to by-pass the Intelligible World, Ishvara, the "Ruler of the Universe"; it aims beyond all personality, even the personality of God. And yet this description is less than accurate; for the soul (Atman) does not seek to become Brahman, nor to be united with it: it seeks, rather, so to escape from all entanglements in any world and from all personality as to *recognise itself as Brahman*: to do away with the "illusion of separateness," and so to know itself for what it eternally is and always has been—very Brahman itself. This carries with it complete loss of personal identity, but not loss of consciousness: on the contrary, it leads to the regaining of that infinite consciousness from which the darkness (Avidya) of its own self-illusion hindered it. It is an utter loss of the finite self in the Infinite Self: the Atman knows itself, beyond knowledge, to be, and always to have been, Brahman. There is no room in such a mysticism for love of any kind: either of man for man, of man for God, or of God for man. For a pure Identity cannot love: love demands difference. I am not concerned here to criticise this type of mystical endeavour, but only to identify it. It finds a close parallel in the thought of Eckhart,† but Eckhart's strange doctrine of the Trinity (strange in its relation to man's place) saves his system from the barrenness of the Vedānta. Completely redeemed and unified, man is, for him, identical with the Son—in fact, is the Son; but the Son is not

* It should be noted that within this third division, within the Sensible World, any number of real or supposed divisions, or 'planes', could exist. For instance, the 'Three Worlds' of Indian thought all fall within it, for it is still the realm of *Maya*.

† Cf. Otto's *Mysticism East and West*.

identical with the Father, and between Father and Son is the Divine Copula, that mutual love which is the Holy Ghost. So, far from by-passing the very condition of love—difference—the whole heart of Eckhart's mysticism is love: not fundamentally the love of man for God, nor, to be strict, of God for man; but the eternal love that subsists (the Third Person) between the Father and the Son, and, by the identification of the purified and abstracted spirit of man with the Son, between God and man. Eckhart, however, while the greatest of all Christian mystics, stands nevertheless distinctly apart from the main current of mysticism, at least of Catholic mysticism. He is too pantheistically inclined to be tolerable to orthodox theology, and, as we know, very nearly got himself condemned as a heretic. We have here, then, in this first type of mysticism—the Yoga associated with the stricter form of the Vedānta—the desire and the attempt on man's part to infinitise himself in an absolute sense: to reach beyond both the Sensible and the Intelligible Worlds to the One-Alone which he essentially is. In such a mysticism there is complete escape from self (though its main drive is essentially selfish); but there is also a complete escape from love, and from anything we can conceive of as life, whether as activity in the world, or intellectual activity, or the passive activity of contemplation. Contemplation here is merely a means to an end, an end in which it disappears. On such a mystical path, it is obvious that absolute detachment from everything, good or bad, becomes necessary, and the highest moral qualities demanded—apart from such heroic qualities as are implicit in the attempt itself—are harmlessness, compassion, and, if action at all, action done for the sole sake of duty. This is the reiterated burden of the *Bhagavad Gita*. But against this utter austerity there were, even in India, many reactions: "The path of the Unmanifest is hard for the embodied to reach," as the *Gita* itself says, and, as a consequence, various schools of Bakhti Yoga, the Yoga of Devotion, arose, one of the finest of which is outlined in the twelfth chapter of the *Gita*: complete devotion to Krishna as the Avatar, the manifested form, of the Unmanifest. Here Hindu mysticism draws very close to Christian mysticism, with its insistence on the love of man for God in Christ.

The second great type of mysticism is the polar opposite of this. Here it is not the Absolute that is sought, nor any self-loss in the Absolute. The soul escapes downward, not upward, and seeks temporary identification with Nature in one of her Energies. This is Daemonic mysticism, and its practice is not withdrawal from the world, but self-oblivion by plunging into the world—by plunging beneath its surface into the living and energising depths within. Its method is the Orgy, and its goal self-identification with the δαίμων. Here, too, a vastly increased range of consciousness seems to have been attained, an entire self-transcendence, and so, a temporary

escape from human finitude: for finitude itself is the final enemy of man, who has in him the urge to, and the capacity of, the Infinite. Finitude is not itself evil—it is the necessary condition for any possible personal experience: the very Absolute has to finitise itself as God if it would know concrete experience; nevertheless, finitude is the precondition of evil, for evil (Original Sin) comes in when man conceives his finite self to be itself of infinite value. Original Sin is a misplaced claim to infinitude: an exaltation of the finite self and an overvaluation of its “rights,” instead of the transcendence of that self. Therefore, those who would save their lives (their finite selves) shall lose them, while those who lose their lives shall find life eternal. It is beyond our purpose to examine minutely the actual method of such an enthusiastic cult as that of Dionysus, but it is most instructive to note the two following points about it: (a) that into the old bottle of a primitive agricultural rite (the rending in pieces and ritual eating of the god) has been poured the new wine of a totally different conception—one element remaining unchanged, namely, the becoming, or being identified with, the god by eating his flesh or, in the case of Dionysus, by drinking his blood, which is also the probable origin of cannibalism; and (b) that this very same “old bottle” now contains the still newer wine of the Eucharistic faith: we still eat the flesh of the sacrificed God and drink his blood, and for an identical reason. The old symbols stay; even much of the old ritual remains in a modified form, for the breaking of the bread at Holy Communion is but the symbolic tearing to pieces of the Dionysian, or other, Victim. The old symbols stay, while succeeding ages and developing faiths pour into them new and higher significance. The real essence of Christ’s teaching fitted exactly into the framework of the surrounding Mystery cults. Is it any wonder that it clothed itself in these most venerable garments and, so clothed, has lived on until today, while without those venerable garments it would probably long ago have degenerated—or, rather “ethicised” itself away—into some pallid take-it-or-leave-it semi-religion, some “morality touched with emotion?” And Christianity is something more and something quite other than ethics: it is redemption and salvation through union with the Saviour-God. But this is by the way.

At this point I want to make something unequivocally clear. I do not, as would an orthodox Christian, consider the foregoing two types of mysticism as fallacious or as erroneous. The experience of man has shown that both these methods produce results: not the same results, but results that have one essential feature in common—escape from the finite self. The one abandons the world utterly, the other identifies itself with the world; but both “save the soul” from its self-imprisonment, both break through the thick and hard carapace that self-consciousness, with its sharp distinction of “I” and “Others,” builds up round the fluid soul all through the long

early millennia of its separate existence. For the soul may be likened to a cell: there is the indestructible living awareness as its nucleus, its psychical "character" as the protoplasmic cell-content, and the outer self-protective cell-wall. It is this cell-wall, and this only, that *has* to go if we are ever to be free of the Universe.

If, now, reference be made to our map, it will be seen that, while Vedântic mysticism is a movement from the Sensible World (on the part of one member of that World) direct to the One-Alone, Orgiastic mysticism is a movement from the crust of that Sensible World inward to its centre, the "World-Soul" of Plotinus. There is as yet no movement of the soul from the Sensible to the Intelligible World—no movement of the Many (on the part of one of the members of that Many) of the One-and-Many relationship to the One of that same relationship. This movement, cropping up sporadically throughout the whole historic past, marked in some of the Indian cults, and most marked in Judaism, reaches its full and final expression only in Christianity.

Of Christian mysticism I need not say much: its main outlines will be familiar enough to the reader. There are, however, a few points that I must make clear if I am later to set this "Fourth Mysticism" in its right place. With all but the very few and the very greatest of the Christian mystics—and of those very greatest I take Eckhart as my example—it may be said that their endeavour was, first, to establish a personal contact with God regarded strictly as a Person; secondly, towards a life lived in ever completer accord with the Divine Will; and, at long last, to reach the most intimate union with God in love. The very greatest went yet further, and saw that beyond "union" was "unity," and that this implied something like total impersonality: this word being used to adumbrate some state of consciousness as much above the Subject-Object relationship—the characteristic relationship of mutual love, which is always mutual separation—as that relationship is above the unselfconscious awareness of the lower animals. But, for the rest, Christian mystics have again and again, directly or indirectly, described their mysticism as "being in love with God." Now, referring to our map, this relationship will be seen to be that of some single individual of the Many to the One of *that Many*: that is, this relationship of "being in love" with God belongs essentially to the Sensible World (which does not mean the world of sense), the numerical symbol of which is the One-and-Many τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά. God is conceived as a personal being—and, outside advanced theology, as a completely limited person on the pattern of man—above and beyond the world, which is in no sense His manifestation, but His creation. This conception reached its supreme expression in Judaic monotheism: indeed, God became so far removed from the world and man, of such "infinite majesty,"

as, in time, to be felt as unapproachable by man, and hence the inception and growth of the Wisdom Tradition, until Wisdom, from being no more than an attribute of God, became almost a separate being intermediate between God and man and the mediatrix between them. This led straight to Philo's position and fitted hand-in-glove with the Logos-theology of the Fourth Gospel; and it was but a step for the unknown author of that Gospel to identify this Logos with that Messiah of Jewish expectation which Jesus was believed to have been. The point I wish to make here is not so much the felt need of an "Advocate with the Father," as the wholly transcendent aspect of God which, apart from that Advocate and, later apart from the Spirit, was the only recognised aspect. Now, it is clear that, if a man is "in love" with God, no other independent love can be tolerated, for here, indeed, God is a "jealous God." For this reason creatures are to be "despised"—not in themselves, for as à Kempis himself says, "there is no creature so small or so vile that it representeth not the goodness of God," but as being, in the remotest degree, *rivals* of God. The love of God (I mean man's love of God, though the converse holds good also) is interpreted in so human, so personal a fashion that it becomes the same kind of love as a man may feel for his fellow, and even more, and more dangerously, the same kind of love as a man may feel for a woman, or a woman for a man. Hence the large part that eroticism so often plays in this third type of mysticism. The greater saints are exempt from it, but the lesser are often its victims: and even more does this seem to have been the case with some of the Sufis. Nevertheless, such an erotic element has its proper place in this kind of mysticism, for the mystical love of God, against all its accepted theology of absolute transcendence and the "wholly otherness" of God, always strives to break down or overpass the barrier between man and God, just as erotic love in the human sense always strives to break down the barrier between man and woman. Neither can succeed if love is to be anything we recognise as love. But there is a "love" beyond all we recognise as such—beyond all personality, whether of God or man: the final realisation of Identity. But this is beyond the view of most western mysticism, and is anathema to the orthodox.

This is the place to come a little nearer to our problem, and to set it in its true light with regard to this third type of mysticism—the specific Christian type. Here we must take into account the mystic's individual temperament. Two main tempers appear to exist, and, corresponding to these, two main mystical attitudes: attitudes which, though almost diametrically opposite, still rest on a common presupposition. There is, first, the temperament that feels itself drawn to the Creator through, and by means of, His creation: the saint loves all things lovely *because* they "manifest

the goodness of God." Note these words: "because they manifest the goodness of God." Of such are St. Francis, and, in particular, his spiritual daughter, St. Douceline, who, when her companions brought her flowers, was immediately transported through their beauty of form and colour and scent into the very presence of God. Opposed to this happy temper is the tragic temper of those—and they are often the stronger souls—who find all earthly beauty, whether of nature or man, a hindrance to their approach to God. All beauty is a snare of the Devil—not because the Devil made that beauty: that is sheer Manicheism—but because, owing to the original corruption of their own human nature, they cannot help opposing the pull towards the beauty of earth to the pull towards God. The first are like the sea at spring tide, when sun and moon add to each other's attraction and the tide rises high; the latter are like the sea at neap tide, when sun and moon, pulling at right angles, counteract each other's attraction and the full flood of the tide is impeded. The first honours the master in the servant; the second sees two masters and knows he cannot serve both. Fundamentally this is no difference of creed: for both of them the beauty of earth is the handiwork of God. It is a radical difference of temperament. The second and more tragic kind numbers most of the great saints and all the great Christian ascetics; and, as a sharp contrast to St. Douceline, I may instance the Curé d'Ars, who would not smell a rose for fear of sin. And quite understandably, and quite rightly, *if* the scent of the rose drew his thoughts and, above all, his affections, away from their sole proper object—God. It is all very well, as many people do, to discredit, and almost to ridicule, the extremes to which this, and many another, saint went; but here was a man who evidently possessed a strong natural love of beauty and strong natural desires: he found these—as most have done and will do—by no means aids, but rather enemies, to his innermost intention and aim: to love God only. What more logical and sane, therefore, than his refusal of beauty and his unceasing flagellations? And here I must say a word about this "flesh," this σάρξ, "the body of this death," which, according to St. Paul, is for ever at war with the spirit. Man contains within him, as part of his total nature, three most powerful "drives": the drive towards Power, of which pride and the instinct of self-preservation are two opposite examples; the drive towards Love, of which the sex-instinct is but one manifestation; and the drive towards Community, of which the herd-instinct is an early form. But even in the animal kingdom this last is not always imperative: gibbons live in organised troops; gorillas are strictly family men and, to that extent, independent of the tribe. So we find that, in the religious life, both the communal life of the cloister and the solitary life of the anchorite find place, but that Poverty and Obedience (the opposites of Power), on the one hand, and Chastity, on the other, were and are imperatives: for the first two are intended to destroy the self-regarding attitude

characteristic of the Power-drive and the root of Original Sin (the finite wrongfully assuming infinite value), and the third destroys the dominance of sex—and by this I mean a great deal more than is commonly understood. Over and above the common understanding of sex, I mean, first, all subjection to the Race, or to mere humanity, and, secondly, the putting of any earthly object of desire or love before the love of God—once more, the wrongful ascription of infinite value to the finite. Nor are the people who put these disciplines into practice freaks, or neurotics, or psychopaths, though some have undoubtedly become such: for the most part, they have been among the sanest, most competent, and most beneficial of men and women. The mystic of any school whatsoever *must* dominate and subdue nature in himself: he must cease to be a slave to anything, and must lift himself—or allow himself to be lifted—above the powers of nature in his own being. This is the object of all asceticism, and it should be clear that the total rejection of the world, characteristic of this third type of mysticism, the specifically Christian type, is sane, logical, and indeed inevitable, so long as the mystic's experience and theory, or theology (and experience and theory play into each other's hands and so reinforce each other) remain limited to the *One-and-Many* picture of the Universe, which is the mark of the Sensible World—"this world which is the world of all of us," as Wordsworth has it. For the One of this "sensible" picture is, when all is said and done, and in despite of all exclusive and honorific titles—"Omnipotent," "Omniscient," and the rest—still but *primus inter pares*: an individual above, and therefore alongside of, all other individuals. My love for a man or a woman, or for a dog or a cat can logically be opposed to my love of God, because all these are fundamentally the same kind of love: the love of a person for a person, whether divine, human, or animal. So can my love of beauty, or truth, or even of "the good," be opposed to my love of God, who, in this Sensible World, must be conceived as above all these and as their Author. An exclusive love of beauty or of truth is, from this point of view, quite as much idolatry as the worship of Moloch. It is this possibility and danger of opposition between love for the Creator and love for the creature, an opposition which, in the *One-and-Many* picture of the Universe, is real enough and must always be taken into account, that leads inevitably to the Christian demand for total self-surrender and the total rejection of the world; for no man can serve two masters when one of those masters is Almighty God.

The second part of "The Fourth Mysticism" entitled "A New Synthesis," will appear in the next issue.